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As the war in Iraq and the campaign against international 
terrorism drag on, the federal and state governments as well as 
nongovernment institutions have grown increasingly bold in 
their efforts to suppress political debate and dissent in the 
United States. Law enforcement officers infiltrate and bully 
peaceful dissident groups; police crack down brutally on mass 
demonstrations; cities confine protestors at major political 
events to ironically designated free speech zones. These 
abuses buttress a contention, familiar from the work of several 
prominent First Amendment theorists, that the Supreme Court 
can provide political debate and dissent sufficient constitu-
tional protection only by aiming First Amendment jurispru-
dence exclusively at protecting political speechexpression 
whose primary value lies in its contribution to political dis-
course. On this view, broad, undifferentiated First Amendment 
protection for speech compels balancing of expressive interests 
against competing regulatory interests, and that balancing too 
easily allows the government to justify suppression of political 
debate. In contrast, narrowing the First Amendments scope to 
encompass only political speech would allow the Court to 
deepen constitutional protection for the category of expression 
that sustains our democratic system. 
The democracy-focused approach to expressive freedom, 
however, has long struggled against the more influential idea 
that the Free Speech Clause exists to guarantee individual 
autonomy. On this view, all speech deserves the same degree of 
constitutional protection because all speech entails the same 
exercise of autonomous will. Accordingly, present First 
Amendment doctrine favors breadth over depth of constitu-
tional protection, giving all behavior that fits the descriptive 
category speech the same presumption of protection against 
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government regulation but balancing all expressive interests 
against countervailing regulatory interests. The Courts sub-
stantial embrace of autonomy as the basis for First Amendment 
doctrine reflects the widespread appeal of autonomy-based con-
ceptions of individual rights. Treating autonomy as the domi-
nant value behind expressive freedom also provides a straight-
forward basis for protecting nonpolitical speech. Deepening 
protection for political speech by narrowing the First Amend-
ments scope would compromise protection of nonpolitical ex-
pression, including much art, sexually explicit speech, and 
commercial advertising. However, despite the strengths of the 
autonomy-focused approach to expressive freedom, its problem 
is that it dilutes the First Amendments protection of political 
speech by allowing even trivial government interests to trump 
the interest in advancing political debate. In addition, by treat-
ing expressive freedom as a negative right, present First 
Amendment doctrine inadequately explains why autonomy 
matters in speech controversies and when autonomy values 
should yield to government regulatory interests. 
An ideal regime of expressive freedom would protect politi-
cal debate with the depth of the democracy-focused First 
Amendment paradigm while simultaneously casting a broad 
enough net to safeguard speech that substantively advances 
autonomy. The Supreme Court recently opened a path toward 
such an ideal regimea path that would expand constitutional 
speech protection beyond the First Amendment into a distinct 
source of constitutional rights. In 2003, the Court held in the 
landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas that state bans on sod-
omy violate the Fourteenth Amendments substantive due 
process guarantee.1 Lawrence has potential importance for 
speech protection because of the decisions two boldest ele-
ments: its emphatic identification of substantive due process 
with the normative value of personal autonomy and its prohibi-
tion of state regulations that rest purely on moral disapproval 
of behavior. By establishing that the Due Process Clause safe-
guards behavior integral to personal autonomy, the Court cre-
ated an alternative repository for the idea that nonpolitical 
speech essential to personal autonomy deserves constitutional 
protection. By interposing the Due Process Clause against 
moral regulations, the Court replicated in the substantive due 
process setting the First Amendments antipathy toward offi-
 
 1. 539 U.S. 558, 57879 (2003). 
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cial attacks on socially undesirable ideas. Substantive due 
process doctrine after Lawrence allows for appropriate balanc-
ing of expressive autonomy interests against government inter-
ests in preventing tangible harms. 
This Article proposes that the Court fulfill the speech-
protective potential of Lawrence by transplanting the Constitu-
tions protection for nonpolitical speechspeech that primarily 
serves the interest in personal autonomy as distinct from the 
interest in democratic debatefrom the First Amendment to 
the Due Process Clause. Invoking substantive due process to 
protect nonpolitical speech would create an unprecedented op-
portunity to deepen the First Amendments protection of politi-
cal speech while improving present First Amendment doctrines 
protection of speech that primarily serves personal autonomy. 
The First Amendments Free Speech Clause would assume a 
coherent focus based on the importance of political debate for a 
healthy democratic system. At the same time, the Constitution 
would protect nonpolitical expression based not on the arid 
premise that such expression is formally speech but on the 
crucial understanding that nonpolitical expression, to the ex-
tent it advances personal autonomy, benefits society as surely 
as political expression does, although in a materially different 
way. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. The first part estab-
lishes both the wisdom and the difficulty of focusing First 
Amendment doctrine on political speech. It reprises the theo-
retical case for a democracy-focused First Amendment and sub-
stantiates that case by describing the governments campaign 
against political dissent since the 2001 terrorist attacks. It then 
discusses the cost for nonpolitical expression of a First Amend-
ment limited to protecting political speech. Finally, it describes 
and criticizes First Amendment theorists prior attempts to 
minimize that cost. The Articles second part examines Law-
rence v. Texas in the context of the Courts previous substantive 
due process jurisprudence and explains how the Lawrence 
Courts innovations facilitate shifting constitutional protection 
of nonpolitical speech from the First Amendment to the Due 
Process Clause. The final part examines what difference a shift 
to due process protection would make for constitutional doc-
trine in three important, controversial areas of substantially 
nonpolitical speech: artistic and cultural expression, pornogra- 
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phy, and commercial advertising. Shielding nonpolitical ex-
pression behind the Due Process Clause rather than the First 
Amendment would expand some aspects of nonpolitical speech 
protection beyond their present scope while diminishing others, 
and the shift would strengthen the theoretical bases for consti-
tutionally shielding both political and nonpolitical speech. 
I.  THE PUBLIC RIGHTS THEORY OF  
EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM AND THE PROBLEM OF  
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH 
A. WHY LIMIT THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROTECTING ONLY 
POLITICAL SPEECH? 
1. Private Rights Versus Public Rights in Free Speech Theory 
The dominant influence on the Supreme Courts First 
Amendment jurisprudence over the past three decades has 
been the private rights theory of expressive freedom.2 The pri-
vate rights theory treats the First Amendment as a guarantor 
of individual autonomy.3 That emphasis on autonomy gener-
ates a formalist vision of expressive freedom.4 A regulation or 
action raises a First Amendment concern whenever the gov-
ernment abridges expressive opportunities that individuals or 
entities secure in the private marketplace.5 Although present 
free speech doctrine rests on a concern for personal autonomy, 
the doctrine says little about what autonomy is or why auton-
omy matters; rather, it simply presumes that speaking reflects 
an important exercise of autonomous will. The private rights 
theory casts freedom of speech as a negative right rather than 
identifying any affirmative purpose of expressive freedom. Ac-
cordingly, it extends First Amendment protection to all expres-
sion without regard to category. Because such broad protection 
threatens to limit a wide range of government authority, the 
private rights theory employs a balancing methodology, mani-
 
 2. For a detailed portrayal of the private rights theory, see Gregory P. 
Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a Public Rights First Amend-
ment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 194759 (2003) [hereinafter Magarian, 
Public Rights]. 
 3. For further discussion of the idea of autonomy that animates the pri-
vate rights theory, see infra notes 13033 and accompanying text. 
 4. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 195456. 
 5. See id. at 195758. 
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fest in the Supreme Courts familiar framework of tiered 
means-ends scrutiny, which allows many government restric-
tions on speech to survive First Amendment review.6 
The Supreme Court frequently recites the aphorism that 
political expression has special significance under the First 
Amendment.7 Its decisions, however, have paved the way for 
the present governmental assault on political dissent8 by dem-
onstrating how the private rights theorys balancing methodol-
ogy serves to validate restrictions on political speech. In its 
most blatant use of balancing to enforce political orthodoxy, the 
Court in Barenblatt v. United States upheld an academics con-
viction for refusing to testify before Congress about his past po-
litical associations.9 Other decisions have turned on the Courts 
subjecting speech restrictions deemed content-neutral, and re-
strictions that apply to speech on government property not tra-
ditionally open for expressive activity, to more lenient judicial 
review than it imposes on content-based regulations of speech 
on private property or in public forums. Illustrative is Clark 
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, in which advocates for 
increased government attention to the problem of homelessness 
 
 6. See id. at 195859. Frederick Schauer has explained this sort of bal-
ancing imperative in rights jurisprudence: The broader the scope of the right, 
the more likely it is to be weaker, largely because widening the scope increases 
the likelihood of conflict with other interests, some of which may be equally or 
more important. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL EN-
QUIRY 13435 (1982). 
 7. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (emphasizing the 
need for First Amendment protection of cross burning that constitutes core 
political speech); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 
(2002) (claiming that speech about the qualifications of candidates for public 
office is a category of speech that is at the core of our First Amendment free-
doms (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 
2001), revd sub nom. White, 536 U.S. at 788)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govt PAC, 
528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000) (echoing a statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1, 
15 (1976) (per curiam), that the constitutional [First Amendment] guarantee 
has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of cam-
paigns for political office); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 
U.S. 182, 18687 (1999) (characterizing First Amendment protection as at its 
zenith for core political speech (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422, 
425 (1988))). 
 8. For a detailed discussion of recent government suppression of political 
debate, some of it sanctioned by federal courts, see infra Part I.A.2. 
 9. See 360 U.S. 109, 12534 (1959). The Barenblatt Court struck the bal-
ance in the governments favor based on the importance of inquiring into the 
extent to which the Communist Party has succeeded in infiltrating into our 
universities, or elsewhere, persons and groups committed to furthering the ob-
jective of overthrow [of the government]. Id. at 129. 
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sought to dramatize their agenda by sleeping in tents erected 
in Lafayette Square Park, in view of the White House.10 The 
Court, ignoring the distinctive impact of this form of political 
advocacy, allowed the government to suppress it under a regu-
lation that restricted sleeping in national parks.11 The private 
rights theory has allowed the Court to uphold restrictions on 
political expression in other cases by deeming a speakers invo-
cation of regulatory mandates to allow expression, and not a 
government-facilitated decision to restrict speech, as the pub-
lic action subject to constitutional sanction. In CBS v. Democ-
ratic National Committee, for example, the Court rejected an-
tiwar advertisers First Amendment challenge to the major 
broadcast networks refusal to sell them advertising time.12 A 
plurality dismissed out of hand the idea that the networks pub-
lic licenses imbued them with quasi-governmental authority 
and thus First Amendment obligations.13 
A series of First Amendment theorists beginning with 
Alexander Meiklejohn14 has developed the public rights theory 
of expressive freedom,15 an alternative vision of the Free 
Speech Clause that contrasts sharply with the private rights 
theory. The public rights theory views the free speech guaran-
tee of the First Amendment not as a negative protection 
 
 10. 468 U.S. 288, 29192 (1984). 
 11. See id. at 29399. To reach its result, the Clark Court applied a defer-
ential species of intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 29394 (stating that restric-
tions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information) (citations omitted). For a 
similar ruling in a different setting, see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund, Inc., which upheld restrictions on political groups ac-
cess to a public employee charity campaign on the ground that the campaign 
was government property and a nonpublic forum. 473 U.S. 788, 80506, 813 
(1985). 
 12. 412 U.S. 94, 97, 132 (1973). 
 13. See id. at 121 (Application of [First Amendment] standards to broad-
cast licensees would be antithetical to the very ideal of vigorous, challenging 
debate on issues of public interest.). 
 14. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960). 
 15. For a detailed portrayal of the public rights theory, see Magarian, 
Public Rights, supra note 2, at 197290. The most important contributors to 
the public rights tradition after Meiklejohn are Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein. 
See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Fiss, Why the State?]; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 255 (1992). 
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against government interference with personal autonomy but 
rather as a Madisonian means to the end of democratic gov-
ernment.16 Under the public rights theory, the central purpose 
of the Free Speech Clause is to ensure that members of the po-
litical community receive the information they need to make in-
formed decisions about matters of public policy.17 That purpose 
is both narrow and critically important. Accordingly, the public 
rights theory rejects the balancing methodology of the private 
rights theory in favor of a categorical approach that would give 
the First Amendment virtually absolute force against threats to 
political discourse.18 The practical consequence of the public 
rights theory is that the government may restrict access to po-
litical expressionin Meiklejohns phrase, the consideration of 
matters of public interest19only where necessary to safe-
guard political debate itself.20 Writing in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, he saw pressing national challenges that made 
pluralistic, participatory democracy critically important, even 
as governmental and societal pressures strangled the political 
dissent necessary for democratic engagement.21 Treating politi-
cal speech as the central object of expressive freedom ensures 
that the First Amendment will not fail in its essential purpose 
of fostering and facilitating self-government.22 
 
 16. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 198384. Vicki Jackson 
has recently pointed out that a politically focused theory of expressive freedom 
draws support from the ascent, after the First Amendments enactment, of 
equal citizenship and popular election of representatives as central features in 
our constitutional order. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Com-
parative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 
295 & n.119 (2003). 
 17. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 198385. 
 18. See id. at 198788. 
 19. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79. 
 20. See id. at 4849. Meiklejohn drew this idea from Justice Brandeiss 
concurrence in Whitney v. California, from which he approvingly quoted the 
proposition that no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and pre-
sent, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may 
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. See 274 U.S. 357, 377 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), quoted in MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 48. 
 21. For a detailed account of Meiklejohns intellectual process in develop-
ing his First Amendment theory, with particular attention given to the influ-
ence of anticommunism run amok, see ADAM R. NELSON, EDUCATION AND DE-
MOCRACY: THE MEANING OF ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN 18721964, at 26395 
(2001). 
 22. Eminent First Amendment theorists have suggested that, in addition 
to democracy and autonomy, expressions essential role in the search for truth 
justifies constitutional expressive freedom. See Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the importance of 
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Focusing the First Amendment on political speech, how-
ever, requires a critical trade-off. If the First Amendment is to 
provide virtually absolute protection for political discourse, 
then courts must categorically distinguish political from nonpo-
litical speech. For Meiklejohn, nonpolitical expressionart, en-
tertainment, scientific inquiryis private speech, outside the 
logical boundaries of First Amendment protection.23 Like a 
sailor who throws excess weight off a sinking ship, Meiklejohn 
calls for sacrificing what he considers less essential categories 
of speech in order to ensure thorough protection of the one 
categorypolitical speechmost integral to the nations de-
mocratic fortunes. Only a trade-off of broad protection, which 
encompasses a wide range of speech but subjects it to judicial 
balancing against countervailing regulatory priorities, for deep 
protection, limited to political speech but virtually absolute in 
its resistance to suppression, will lead to a First Amendment 
regime sufficient to protect vigorous political debate and dis-
sent.24 
No less distinguished a pair of strange bedfellows than 
Robert Bork and Cass Sunstein has elaborated the case for lim-
iting the First Amendments scope to encompass only political 
speech, although their arguments follow widely divergent 
courses of reasoning. According to Bork, courts must focus the 
First Amendment on political expression in order to avoid the 
judicial activism that protecting any less constitutionally 
grounded categories of expression would entail.25 For Sunstein, 
reserving the First Amendments core for political speech would 
both effectuate the Constitutions central purpose of fostering 
 
testing assertions justifies First Amendment protection for speech); Thomas I. 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 
88182 (1963) (including attainment of truth among principal justifications 
for expressive freedom). The public and private rights theories offer norma-
tively opposed ways of thinking about expressive freedom, with each taking 
account of the search for truth to the extent that search serves the ends of, re-
spectively, collective political decision making or individual autonomy. 
 23. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 7980 (discussing private speech 
generally); id. at 8384 (characterizing scholarly pursuits, particularly in the 
sciences, as partially private); id. at 8688 (criticizing commercial radio as re-
flecting private rather than public interests). 
 24. See id. at 7879. 
 25. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). Even as Bork advocates the centrality of 
political expression, he departs significantly from the public rights theory by 
endorsing criminalization of speech that advocates forcible overthrow of the 
government. See id. 
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public deliberation and leave speech that hinders the develop-
ment of popular sovereignty open to certain kinds of regula-
tion.26 Although Bork and Sunstein make forceful arguments 
for elevating political speech to First Amendment primacy, nei-
ther has put a dent in the Courts commitment to the private 
rights theory. One reason for their lack of influence is their in-
ability to match the historical urgency of Meiklejohns 
McCarthy-era plea for political openness: Borks article ap-
peared in 1971, during a golden age of judicial support for po-
litical dissent,27 while Sunstein wrote in 1992, amid an era of 
relative national calm. 
2. The Current Surge in Suppression of Political Speech 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, set events into 
motion that buttress the public rights theorys call to circle the 
First Amendments wagons around political speech. Our gov-
ernments war on terrorism has fostered a climate of hostility 
toward political dissent in the United States unseen since 
Meiklejohns time. Elsewhere I have documented the recent in-
crease in nongovernmental institutions suppression of political 
debate and dissent.28 In the more traditional zone of First 
Amendment concern, federal and state law enforcement offi-
cials since 2001 have dramatically increased their efforts to in-
timidate, marginalize, and silence political dissenters. These 
efforts have chilled dissent and exerted enormous pressure to-
ward political conformity. A statement by the California Anti-
Terrorism Information Center exemplifies the present atmos-
phere: [I]f you have a protest group protesting a war where the 
cause thats being fought against is international terrorism, 
you might have terrorism at that protest . . . . You can almost 
 
 26. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 305. 
 27. That year brought the most profound and farthest reaching majority 
opinion the Supreme Court has ever delivered about the value of speech gen-
erally and political dissent in particular. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 
2021, 26 (1971) (reversing on First Amendment grounds the conviction of a 
man who displayed a jacket bearing the words Fuck the Draft in a county 
courthouse; noting that the defendants speech did not constitute fighting 
words; and rejecting an asserted state interest in protecting the sensibilities 
of the public, noting that an observer could simply avert[ ] their eyes). 
 28. See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private 
Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 11527 (2004) [hereinafter Magarian, Wartime De-
bate]. 
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argue that a protest against that is a terrorist act.29 In the few 
instances when federal courts have entertained First Amend-
ment challenges to the governments recent attacks on political 
dissent, they have employed the balancing methodology of the 
private rights theory to justify those attacks.30 Most muffled 
dissenters have never even gone to court, many certainly be-
cause of the costs of litigation but others, no doubt, because 
they have concluded from the shape of present free speech doc-
trine that a court would only validate government censorship.31 
Law enforcement began to display increased antipathy to-
ward political protestors in November 1999, when Seattle po-
lice greeted protestors against a World Trade Organization 
meeting with pepper spray, concussion grenades, and rubber 
bullets, and the mayor created a no protest zone around the 
Seattle Convention Center.32 In the wake of the Seattle deba-
cle, cities that host high-profile public events have routinely in-
voked law enforcement necessity to restrict protestors to dis-
tant, cramped ghettoesdubbed, in an Orwellian flourish that 
swallows irony like a black hole, free speech zones.33 This tac-
tic, which absurdly overreaches legitimate security needs, pre-
vents dissenting voices from challenging the potent propaganda 
of major public spectacles and expanding public debate about 
important issues. During the 2000 Democratic National Con-
vention, for example, the Los Angeles Police Department estab-
lished a security perimeter around the Staples Center that kept 
protestors 260 yards away from convention delegates.34 In that 
case, however, a federal judge ruled the perimeter unconstitu-
 
 29. Michelle Goldberg, Outlawing Dissent, SALON.COM, Feb. 11, 2004, 
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/02/11/cointelpro/print.html (quot-
ing Mike Van Winkle, spokesman for the California Anti-Terrorism Informa-
tion Center). 
 30. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Natl Convention v. City of Boston, 
327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 6676 (D. Mass. 2004), aff d sub nom. Bl(a)ack Tea Socy v. 
City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004); Natl Council of Arab Ams. v. 
City of N.Y., 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 258, 26566 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 31. For a discussion of present free speech doctrines insufficient protec-
tion of political debate and dissent beyond the incidents discussed in this sec-
tion, see supra notes 713 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Patrick F. Gillham & Gary T. Marx, Complexity and Irony in Po-
licing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle, 27 SOC. JUST. 
212, 217 (2000). 
 33. Dave Lindorff, Keeping Dissent Invisible, SALON.COM, Oct. 16, 2003, 
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/10/16/secret_service/print.html. 
 34. Serv. Employees Intl Union v. City of L.A., 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968 
(C.D. Cal. 2000). 
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tional, finding its size and around-the-clock enforcement not 
narrowly tailored to the governments interest in public 
safety.35 That decision reflects what we usually assume to be 
the axiomatic First Amendment protection of political protest.36 
Unfortunately, the September 11 attacks eroded courts re-
solve against antiprotest measures. In July 2004, two protest 
groups requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the City 
of Boston from designating a 300-foot by 90-foot space under 
abandoned subway tracks as the free speech zone for the 2004 
Democratic National Convention.37 The zone was surrounded 
by two rows of concrete jersey barriers, each topped with an 
eight-foot-high chain-link fence covered in tightly woven mesh 
fabric.38 Looser mesh netting attached the top of the fence to 
the subway tracks above, which were wrapped in razor wire.39 
A federal judge described the space as a grim, mean, and op-
pressive space that created an impression of an internment 
camp or a holding pen where potentially dangerous persons 
are separated from others.40 He stressed that the design of the 
zone is an offense to the spirit of the First Amendment[,] . . . a 
brutish and potentially unsafe place for citizens who wish to 
exercise their First Amendment rights.41 Nonetheless, he re-
fused to enjoin the zone, citing the constraints of the physical 
location and law enforcements safety concerns as barriers to a 
solution that would vindicate plaintiffs First Amendment 
rights.42 Less than a month later, another federal judge sus-
tained the New York City Parks Departments decision to deny 
the National Council of Arab Americans a permit to protest on 
the Great Lawn during the 2004 Republican National Conven-
tion.43 Although the court acknowledged the sites symbolic 
 
 35. See id. at 971 (holding that a designated security zone unconstitution-
ally infringed protestors First Amendment rights). 
 36. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (invoking the 
First Amendment to overturn the conviction of an antidraft protestor for wear-
ing a Fuck the Draft jacket in a courthouse). 
 37. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Natl Convention v. City of Boston, 
327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D. Mass. 2004), aff d sub nom. Bal(a)ack Tea Socy v. 
City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 38. Id. at 67. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 67, 7475. 
 41. Id. at 76. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Natl Council of Arab Ams. v. City of N.Y., 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (characterizing the defendants interest in maintaining 
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value for the protestors, it held that the governments interest 
in maintaining the park outweighed their interest in symbolic 
expression.44 
Venturing outside their cages has gotten protestors ar-
rested. In October 2003, federal agents arrested a retired 
steelworker and his sister after they refused to move their anti-
Bush sign to a designated free speech area at a campaign 
rally in Pittsburgh.45 Based on this and numerous similar inci-
dents, the ACLU filed suit against the Secret Service, contend-
ing that segregating protestors violated their constitutional 
rights.46 Although the Secret Service pledged to discontinue 
segregating protestors,47 the practice continues. When Presi-
dent Bush appeared at the West Virginia Capitol for a July 4, 
2004 campaign rally, police arrested a young couple wearing 
anti-Bush t-shirts and charged them with trespassingon pub-
lic property.48 In September 2004, a woman wearing a t-shirt 
stenciled with President Bush You Killed My Son, to protest 
her sons death in Iraq, shouted questions at First Lady Laura 
Bush during a campaign speech.49 New Jersey police arrested 
her for defiant trespass even though she said she had a ticket 
to attend the rally.50 In other cases, people seeking to attend 
 
and managing a public park as a significant government interest). 
 44. See id. at 258, 26566 (recognizing the plaintiffs belief that the loca-
tion was symbolic but denying the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunc-
tion due to the doctrine of laches and the plaintiffs failure to show a likelihood 
of success on the merits). 
 45. Lindorff, supra note 33 (documenting a protestors arrest for disor-
derly conduct when he refused to relocate to a segregated area behind a chain-
link fence to display a sign that read The Bushes must love the poortheyve 
made so many of us). 
 46. See id. (describing ACLU findings of at least seventeen similar inci-
dents and an ACLU suit against the Secret Service). 
 47. See Jennifer Bundy, Couple Arrested for Wearing Anti-Bush T-shirts to 
W. Va. Event Sues Federal Officials, N. COUNTY TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/09/14/news/nation/16_51_349_ 
14_04.prt (noting that the Secret Service agreed to discontinue its segregation 
policy). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Soldiers Mom Interrupts Laura Bushs Speech, CNN.COM, Sept. 20, 
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/09/17/bush.protester/index 
.html. The Secret Service contemplated whether the woman, Sue Niederer, 
had violated a federal law banning threats to kill the president when she told 
an online magazine that she wanted to rip the presidents head off. Secret 
Service Reviews Comments By Dead Soldiers Mom, WNBC.COM, Sept. 22, 
2004, http://www.wnbc.com/print/3751305/detail.html. 
 50. Soldiers Mom Interrupts Laura Bushs Speech, supra note 49. 
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speeches by President Bush have reported being ejected or 
barred simply because of their perceived opposition to admini-
stration policies.51 
Government officials since the 2001 attacks have also used 
increasingly aggressive investigation and questioning to in-
timidate people who express dissenting political views. In No-
vember 2001, FBI and Secret Service agents appeared at a 
small Houston art museum and interrogated a curator for over 
an hour about a new exhibit called Secret Wars, which focused 
on covert government operations.52 In November 2003, the U.S. 
Attorneys Office in Iowa served Drake University with a sub-
poena demanding information about an on-campus antiwar 
demonstration sponsored by the Universitys National Lawyers 
Guild chapter.53 The government claimed the subpoena was 
necessary for the investigation of a single trespassing incident 
on nearby National Guard property.54 Only mounting public 
pressure led the U.S. Attorney to withdraw the subpoena in 
February 2004.55 FBI officials have interrogated political dem-
onstrators in advance of several public events, including the 
2004 Democratic and Republican National Conventions.56 The 
Department of Justice has also investigated people associated 
with Internet sites the government deems subversive of U.S. 
interests.57 Relying extensively on its powers under the U.S.A. 
Patriot Act,58 the Department has charged website owners 
 
 51. See Ron Hutcheson, Bush Backers Allegedly Keep Dissenters Away, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 31, 2005, at A4 (discussing the ejection of Iraq War op-
ponents in Denver, Colorado, and blacklisting of Democrats in Fargo, North 
Dakota). 
 52. Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to Door, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, at 1. 
 53. Monica Davey, Subpoenas on Antiwar Protest Are Dropped, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at A18 (discussing a subpoena issued to Drake Univer-
sity for participant and content information about a National Lawyers Guild-
sponsored antiwar forum). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at A1 (discussing FBI interviews of past protestors 
and their friends and family members in six states in weeks prior to both 
2004 political conventions). 
 57. Eric Lipton & Eric Lichtblau, Online and Even Near Home, a New 
Front Is Opening in the Global Terror Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at 
A12. 
 58. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. Patriot) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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whose sites contain incendiary information with provid[ing] 
expert advice or assistance to terrorists.59 Other objects of 
FBI and Secret Service attention have included a middle-aged 
Californian who criticized President Bushs ties to oil compa-
nies during a conversation at his gym60 and a North Carolina 
college freshman who displayed a poster in her dorm room that 
criticized President Bushs record on capital punishment as 
governor of Texas.61 
Numerous people who have mounted peaceful protests 
against the present government have paid for their efforts in 
blood, liberty, or positions in government institutions. In No-
vember 2001, the School of the Americas, a controversial opera-
tion that trains foreign nationals in military tactics, cracked 
down on an annual, nonviolent demonstration at Fort Bening, 
claiming the protest was not appropriate during the war on 
terrorism.62 Although the event remained nonviolent, law-
enforcement officials arrested and prosecuted dozens of protes-
tors on trespassing charges.63 A year later, Miami police at-
tacked protestors who marched in opposition to a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas meeting.64 When police announced over a 
bullhorn that the demonstration would continue only if it re-
 
 59. Lipton & Lichtblau, supra note 57. In 2003, the government leveled 
such charges against Sami Omar al-Hussayen, a recently emigrated PhD can-
didate, after he established websites that were devoted to Middle East news 
and cheered suicide attacks. See id. A judge allowed the case to reach a jury. 
See id. Despite scouring files and files and files of evidence, the jurors ac-
quitted al-Hussayen because they could find no evidence that he was affiliated 
with a terrorist organization. Id. (quoting a juror). Similar charges are pend-
ing against a British citizen, but British authorities have so far refused to ex-
tradite the defendant to the United States. See id. (discussing charges pending 
against Babar Ahmad in federal district court in Connecticut). 
 60. See Axtman, supra note 52. 
 61. See id. For a discussion of other recent instances in which federal law 
enforcement officers have investigated or pressured people who displayed or 
created works that satirized the Bush administration, see Lauren Gilbert, 
Mocking George: Political Satire as True Threat in the Age of Global Terror-
ism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 84753 (2004). 
 62. Alisa Solomon, Things We Lost in the Fire, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 11
17, 2002, at 32 (quoting Father Roy Bourgeois, founder of School of the Ameri-
cas Watch). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Ben Manski, Massacre in Miami? It Was a Defeat for Protestors, 
CAP. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at 13A. Miami police had prepared for the meeting 
by stockpiling riot gear, erecting an 8-foot high security fence around the pro-
test zone, and setting up a rumor control hotline to field calls about alleged 
protests. Tamara Lush, Trade Talks Put Miami on Edge, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at 1A. 
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mained peaceful, a protestor responded, Does that include po-
lice violence?65 The police replied with batons, tear gas, rubber 
bullets, pepper spray, and concussion grenades.66 The congres-
sionally funded United States Institute of Peace forced a con-
flict resolution trainer to resign because of her public state-
ments criticizing U.S. foreign policy.67 The University of South 
Florida fired a tenured professor for harshly criticizing Israel.68 
A West Virginia high school suspended a student for wearing a 
t-shirt that said Racism, Sexism, Homophobia, Im So Proud of 
People in the Land of the So-Called Free, and the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court upheld the suspension.69 These actions 
took place despite the First Amendments ostensible protection 
of political expression by public employees70 and students.71 
The Supreme Court has held that infiltration and monitoring of 
peaceful political groups violates political dissenters First 
Amendment right of political association.72 It also offends First 
Amendment principles by casting the very act of opposing the 
government as legally suspect, andif the government strate-
gically publicizes the monitoringby chilling expression.73 
Nonetheless, government infiltration and monitoring of dis-
senters, so infamous from the days of McCarthyism and COIN-
TELPRO,74 has reemerged during the present campaign 
against terrorism. After the September 11 attacks, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft loosened guidelines for federal investi-
gations in order to ensure that if there is a rally of people who 
 
 65. Manski, supra note 64. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Matthew Rothschild, The New McCarthyism, PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 
2002, at 19. 
 68. See Solomon, supra note 62. 
 69. See Rothschild, supra note 67, at 20. 
 70. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 574 (1968) (holding 
that the First Amendment barred the board of education from firing a teacher 
for making public statements criticizing the boards policies). 
 71. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) 
(holding that the First Amendment barred a public school from suspending 
students for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War). 
 72. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (rejecting on First 
Amendment grounds a states demand for a civil rights groups membership 
list). 
 73. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1319 (2004) (discussing the chilling effect 
on First Amendment rights of government surveillance and infiltration of po-
litical dissenters). 
 74. See Goldberg, supra note 29. 
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are criticizing the United States and its policies and saying 
that the United States will someday perhaps be destroyed be-
cause of that, the FBI agent can go and listen to whats being 
said.75 In 2003, the FBI encouraged local law enforcement offi-
cials to monitor antiwar groups and political protests for signs 
of terrorist activity,76 and the federal government has poured 
funding into local red squads.77 When an FBI employee ar-
gued that those mandates confused protected speech with ille-
gal activity, the Department of Justices Office of Legal Counsel 
declared the activity constitutionally appropriate.78 Since then, 
groups across the nation, including the Colorado Coalition 
Against the War, the American Friends Service Committee, 
and Peace Fresno have reported undercover officers infiltrating 
their organizations.79 
In an effort to publicize government assaults on political 
dissent, the ACLU and the Center for National Security Stud-
ies filed Freedom of Information Act requests for statistics re-
garding the Justice Departments post-September 11 activi-
ties.80 When the Department denied each request, the groups 
filed suit in federal district court; in each case, the court sided 
with the government.81 One federal judge upheld the Justice 
Departments refusal to release general statistics regarding its 
use of various surveillance and investigatory tools authorized 
by the Patriot Act, holding that the Departments interest in 
protecting national security justified secrecy.82 Another federal 
judge held that the Patriot Acts national security exemption 
protected the Departments refusal to turn over statistics re-
garding the frequency of its requests for tangible things in an 
 
 75. Id. (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft in a 2002 interview). 
 76. See Lichtblau, supra note 56 (discussing FBI requests to local law en-
forcement agencies regarding monitoring of political dissenters and an inter-
nal complaint filed by an FBI employee citing concerns about the requests in-
fringement of constitutional free speech protections). 
 77. See Solomon, supra note 62 (discussing government infiltration tac-
tics). 
 78. See Lichtblau, supra note 56 (Given the limited nature of such public 
monitoring, any possible chilling effect caused by the bulletins would be quite 
minimal and substantially outweighed by the public interest in maintaining 
safety and order during large-scale demonstrations. (quoting a Department of 
Justice opinion)). 
 79. See Goldberg, supra note 29. 
 80. See ACLU v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 
2004); ACLU v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 21 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 81. See 321 F. Supp. 2d at 38; 265 F. Supp. 2d at 3435. 
 82. See 265 F. Supp. 2d at 31. 
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authorized investigation.83 The court cited longstanding def-
erence to the Executive Branch regarding national security 
matters and asserted judicial incompetence to second-guess 
the executives judgment on national security.84 Public access 
to information about the workings of government is essential in 
a democratic society. These decisions, however, validated what 
has been an unprecedented government effort to shield such in-
formation from public scrutiny.85 
The First Amendment is supposed to ensure that the news 
media can vigorously pursue and report news about govern-
ment actions and proceedings.86 But the Bush administration, 
through control of access to information and occasional overt 
pressure, has eviscerated the news medias traditional watch-
dog role, a process that media corporations frequent self-
censorship has made shamefully easy.87 One particularly im-
portant instance of heightened government secrecy is a federal 
policy, issued within days of the 2001 attacks and altering dec-
ades of past practice, of reflexively closing deportation hearings 
on national security grounds.88 Under that policy, the Depart-
 
 83. See 321 F. Supp. 2d at 26, 37. 
 84. Id. at 30. 
 85. See Eric Lichtblau, Government Shrinking Access to Information, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2001, at 28A (describing the general in-
crease in government secrecy in the wake of the September 11 attacks); On the 
Publics Right To Know: The Day Ashcroft Censored Freedom of Information, 
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 6, 2002, at D4 (discussing a memorandum from Attorney 
General John Ashcroft that vigorously urged federal agencies to resist most 
Freedom of Information Act requests made by American citizens). 
 86. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) 
(holding that the right [of the press and public] to attend criminal trials is 
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to enjoin publication of 
the Pentagon Papers, leaked government documents related to national secu-
rity). 
 87. See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 11721 (document-
ing instances of misinformation and suppression of information by U.S. news 
media since the 2001 terrorist attacks). The Bush administrations unprece-
dented promotion of its policies via Potemkin journalistsincluding secret 
payments to opinion commentators, production and distribution of fake televi-
sion news segments, and issuance of White House press credentials to an in-
cognito conservative activisthas exacerbated the failures of real media out-
lets. See Frank Rich, The White House Stages Its Daily Show, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 2005, at B1 (describing the Bush administrations disinformation tac-
tics). 
 88. See Directive of Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Im-
migration Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), http://news 
.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf [hereinafter Creppy Di-
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ment of Justice holds unfettered discretion to designate any 
immigration proceeding a special interest matter, based on a 
belief that the immigrant might have connections with, or pos-
sess information pertaining to, terrorist activities against the 
United States.89 A special interest designation requires 
courts to seal the case file; remove the case from the docket; 
and bar the detainees family, visitors, and reporters from the 
proceedings.90 This policy has allowed the government to decide 
the fates of hundreds of immigrants without the accountability 
that open proceedings ensure.91 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has upheld the policy against consti-
tutional challenge,92 although the Sixth Circuit has disagreed;93 
meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit has upheld the governments re-
fusal even to provide a count of hearings closed under the pol-
icy.94 
 
rective]. The Creppy Directive altered a longstanding policy that deportation 
proceedings were open to the public. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 
F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002) (Since 1965, INS regulations have explicitly re-
quired deportation hearings to be presumptively open.). 
 89. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting a declaration by Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director 
for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence at the FBI), cert. denied, 538 
U.S. 1056 (2003). 
 90. See Creppy Directive, supra note 88. 
 91. An estimated 600 detainees endured closed hearings through mid-
2003. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: 
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 95, 9596 (2004) (citing a figure provided by Solicitor General Theo-
dore Olsen in a brief opposing writ of certiorari in North Jersey Media Group). 
Despite evidence that almost none of the people subjected to closed deporta-
tion hearings have terrorist connections, the Department of Justice has con-
tinued to close hearings. See id. at 96 & n.8 (noting the Departments ac-
knowledgment that most detainees did not have information regarding 
terrorist activities). The Department has publicly suggested it may reconsider 
the Creppy Directive. See Behind Closed Doors, INTL HERALD TRIB., May 31, 
2003, at 6 (quoting the Department as saying that procedures for closed hear-
ings might likely be revised). At this time, however, the policy appears un-
changed. 
 92. See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221 (holding the Creppy Di-
rective constitutional under the analysis set forth in Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)). 
 93. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701 (holding the Creppy Directive 
unconstitutional under the analysis set forth in Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U.S. at 575). 
 94. See Ctr. for Natl Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 
921 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (sustaining the Department of Justices right to deny a 
Freedom of Information Act request concerning INS detainees), cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
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The threat of unaccountable deportation does not, of 
course, represent our governments only recent assault on resi-
dent foreign nationals. The Court has held that the First 
Amendment protects the expressive rights of noncitizens,95 and 
this protection increases the presence of diverse viewpoints in 
domestic political debate.96 Those considerations, however, 
have not stopped the government from using the exceptional 
leverage it holds over foreign nationals in the United States to 
suppress their political association and expression.97 Govern-
ment actions, most prominently the broad and seemingly arbi-
trary practice of questioning and often detaining noncitizens for 
alleged associations with asserted terrorists, have effectively 
chilled immigrant communities from speaking out on political 
issues that strongly affect their interests.98 
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the First Amendment has 
failed in its essential task of protecting political dissent. That 
failure provides powerful support for the trade-off urged by the 
public rights theory of expressive freedom: narrow the scope of 
the Free Speech Clause to cover only political expression in or-
der to deepen protection of that most essential category of 
speech by eliminating the balancing of political expression 
against government regulatory interests.99 That trade-off would 
improve upon the present state of constitutional protection for 
political debate and dissent in numerous ways. First, the public 
rights theory would compel courts to extend political expression 
far greater protection against government regulation than it 
currently enjoys. Unless the government could justify a re- 
 
 
 95. Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this 
country. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (citing Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), which overturned a contempt-of-court conviction of 
an alien labor leader that rested on a telegram to the Secretary of Labor about 
a pending case). 
 96. Cf. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 119 (contending that unhindered 
expression must be open to non-citizens, to resident aliens, to writers and 
speakers of other nations, to anyone, past or present, who has something to 
say which may have significance for a citizen who is thinking of the welfare of 
this nation). 
 97. See Solomon, supra note 62 (discussing the broad powers of the Attor-
ney General to identify and detain noncitizens suspected of terrorist ties un-
der the U.S.A. Patriot Act). Many Muslim Americans fear even appearing at 
community events. See, e.g., id. (discussing decreased attendance at a Brook-
lyn Pakistani community festival). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See supra notes 1427 and accompanying text. 
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straint on political debate as needed to protect political debate 
itself, the public rights theory would impose a rigorous pre-
sumption against the restraint. Second, more dissenters who 
faced government sanction would have reason to avail them-
selves of judicial process, because courts adjudications of First 
Amendment cases would send a consistent message that our 
legal system took constitutional protection of political debate 
seriously. Third, the public rights theorys emphasis on robust 
political debate as the necessary bottom line of First Amend-
ment doctrine would justify courts in blocking even some non-
governmental constraints on public political debate, at least in 
wartime.100 Fourth, that same bottom-line view of expressive 
freedom would produce a more open and dynamic political 
process that would widen the variety of viewpoints present in 
public political debate.101 
Making political speech the exclusive object of First 
Amendment protection would bring impressive benefits. The 
public rights theorys problem, however, is that its proposed 
trade-off of broadly protecting all speech for deeply protecting 
only political speech entails steep, arguably intolerable costs in 
exposure of nonpolitical speech to official suppression. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH PROTECTING ONLY POLITICAL SPEECH 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
1. Distinguishing Political Speech 
Although this Article concentrates on the doctrinal conse-
quences of limiting the First Amendment to protection of politi-
cal speech,102 the discussion will benefit from consideration of a 
logically prior problem: the need to distinguish political from 
nonpolitical speech. Meiklejohn acknowledged that [t]he hu-
man relations involved in the distinction between the general 
welfare and individual advantage are deeply and permanently 
perplexing.103 Is art political? Does the arguably transgressive 
character of pornography render it political? What about com-
mercial information that affects important consumer decisions? 
Even if any or all of these categories of speech are not inher- 
 
 
 100. See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 15068. 
 101. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 201060. 
 102. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 103. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 81. 
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ently political, do they acquire political character whenever at-
tempts at official censorship make them objects of political con-
troversy?104 
Line-drawing problems inhere in the necessary task of pro-
viding a theoretical explanation for expressive freedom.105 The 
dominant private rights theory of expressive freedom,106 which 
rejects categorization of types of speech, nevertheless entails at 
least three problematic exercises in line drawing. First, because 
some concept must bound the First Amendments constraint on 
government authority, the private rights theorys disdain for 
categorical distinctions requires it to stake a great deal on the 
notoriously elusive distinction between speech and action.107 
Second, the private rights theorys balancing methodology re-
quires identifying and comparing distinct regulatory and ex-
pressive values.108 This balancing process impels courts both to 
assess the relative importance of different sorts of expressive 
conduct109 and to determine whether a government regulatory 
interest somehow outweighs a conceptually incommensurable 
expressive interest.110 Third, the private rights theorys nega-
 
 104. Critics of the theory have repeatedly noted this problem. Objections to 
Meiklejohns distinction between public and private speech immediately 
formed the leading attack on his First Amendment theory. See NELSON, supra 
note 21, at 27074 (summarizing and discussing early criticisms). Leading ex-
amples include Robert C. Post, Meiklejohns Mistake: Individual Autonomy 
and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (1993) 
(arguing that Meiklejohn violates th[e] necessary indeterminacy of public dis-
course by limiting what can count as political); Martin H. Redish, The Value 
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 59697 (1982) (criticizing Meiklejohns 
line drawing); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regula-
tion: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
1212, 122539 (1983) (arguing against a distinction between political and 
commercial speech). 
 105. For the leading explanation of the need for some theory to ground free 
speech doctrine, see Emerson, supra note 22, at 87778. 
 106. See supra notes 26 and accompanying text (describing the private 
rights theory). 
 107. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 48788 (1993) (uphold-
ing a penalty enhancement for racially motivated crime because the enhance-
ment targeted bias-inspired conduct rather than expression). 
 108. See supra notes 713 and accompanying text. 
 109. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 2021 (1976) (per curiam) (con-
cluding that political contributions have less expressive value than political 
expenditures). 
 110. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357
70 (1997) (assessing minor parties expressive interest in having the option to 
choose another partys nominee as its own fusion nominee, assessing the 
states asserted political stability interests in banning fusion candidacies, and 
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tive model of expressive rights places defining emphasis on a 
rigid distinction between the ephemeral categories of public 
and private.111 Resolving any First Amendment theorys line-
drawing problems requires difficult judgments about whatever 
factors the theory emphasizes in defining expressive freedom. 
Theorists in the public rights tradition have tried to gener-
ate a strict definition of political speech. Meiklejohn defines the 
proper class of protected expression as limited to speech which 
bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have 
to deal . . . , to the consideration of matters of public inter-
est.112 Sunstein treat[s] speech as political when it is both in-
tended and received as a contribution to public deliberation 
about some issue.113 These attempts to define political speech 
share two problems. First, they fail to achieve any clear, satis-
fying delineation. Meiklejohns directly or indirectly, Sun-
steins reliance on subjective intent and perception, and their 
shared emphasis on the uncertain notion of public affairs seem 
to preclude a stable understanding of which speech counts as 
political. Second, even if we could arrive at a fixed, stable 
definition of political speech, judicial reliance on that defini-
tion might stunt growth over time in our understanding of 
what concerns should become subjects of collective societal de-
liberation and resolution. Such a definition, for example, might 
have interfered with our societys emerging awareness over the 
past half century of the relationship between sexual identity 
and political change.114 Thus, a stable conception of political 
speech appears impossible at best and undesirable at worst. 
Efforts to define political speech offer promise, however, if 
we resist the allure of stability and instead consider politics 
as a dynamic concept.115 On this understanding, the category of 
 
concluding that the latter outweighed the former). 
 111. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 195658 (explaining the 
private rights theorys reliance on the public-private distinction to vindicate a 
negative right to expressive freedom). For a thorough critique of the public-
private distinction in the context of First Amendment doctrine, see Magarian, 
Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 12750. 
 112. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 79. 
 113. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 304. 
 114. See generally GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Walter L. Williams & Yolanda Retter eds., 2003) 
(discussing sexual minorities struggle for rights against the dominant views of 
society). 
 115. I have previously advocated a similar distinction in the practice of 
partisan politics in the United States. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 
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political speech attains distinction not lexically but function-
ally. Meiklejohn wrote much less about what political speech is 
than about what it does: it presents squarely and fearlessly 
everything that can be said in favor of [governing] institutions, 
everything that can be said against them.116 In his founda-
tional explanation of expressive freedom as a public right, 
[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs from the neces-
sities of the program of self-government.117 Accordingly, a 
practical distinction of political speech transcends any single, 
abstract inquiry, requiring instead an ongoing examination 
that encompasses both theoretical inquiry and concrete adjudi-
cation. 
Although the Supreme Court knows how to differentiate 
constitutional speech protection based on distinctions among 
explicit categories of speech,118 it probably would implement 
the public rights theory most effectively not by attempting a 
rigid delineation of political speech but rather by examining in 
any given case whether a burden on speech undermined dis-
course best understood as concerning matters of public delib-
eration or, in contrast, undermined speech best understood as 
serving some individuals interest in personal autonomy. The 
Court has shown an understanding of how to draw exactly this 
sort of distinction in more limited First Amendment contexts. 
In a defamation case, the court will afford a defendants alleg-
edly defamatory statement heightened insulation from liability 
if the statements object is a public official119 or a public fig-
 
2, at 19962003 (setting forth the dynamic party politics theory of political 
parties role in elections). 
 116. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 77. 
 117. Id. at 27. Professor Fiss, another leading architect of the public rights 
theory, similarly advocates a public debate principle of expressive freedom, 
under which [state] action is judged by its impact on public debate, a social 
state of affairs. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 15, at 786. 
 118. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 76170 (1976) (defining commercial speech as a category of ex-
pression entitled to less than full First Amendment protection); Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscenity as a category of unpro-
tected speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 44748 (1969) (defining 
incitement to imminent lawless action as a category of unprotected speech); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (defining true threats as a 
category of unprotected speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 
(1964) (recognizing some defamation as a category of unprotected speech); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 57172 (1942) (defining fighting 
words as a category of unprotected speech). 
 119. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasizing the profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibi-
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ure.120 The court has insulated public employees and publish-
ers of sensitive information from adverse actions that targeted 
speech about matters of public concern.121 In evaluating media 
regulations, the Court has permitted broadcast content re-
quirements based at least in part on the idea that broadcasters, 
by virtue either of their public licenses122 or their control over 
communication bottlenecks,123 perform a special public func-
tion. All of these rules require functional assessments of the 
public importance of certain types or means of expressionthe 
same sort of assessment a court would need to make if First 
Amendment jurisprudence shifted toward a focus on political 
expression. 
The line between subjects of public and private concern 
disappears at some level of abstraction.124 Certainly that lines 
 
ted, robust, and wide-open in applying a more stringent standard of proof to 
defamation actions brought by public officials). 
 120. See Curtis Publg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 15455 (1967) (extending 
the Sullivan requirement for defamation judgments to cases brought by pub-
lic figures). 
 121. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 53435 (2001) (rejecting the 
application of wiretap statutes to republication of illegally obtained informa-
tion because privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in 
publishing matters of public importance); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 571, 57475 (1968) (overturning a school boards firing of the plaintiff for 
speaking about a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment 
of the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a society 
that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive). Eugene 
Volokh asserted that it shouldnt be for courts to decide what is a matter of 
public concern and what isnt, given that [m]ost such matters of taste are 
left to individual speakers and listeners to determine. Eugene Volokh, Free-
dom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Li-
quormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 747 (2003). Volokhs position 
exemplifies the logical consequences of the private rights theorys negative, 
purposeless conception of expressive freedom. See supra notes 26 and accom-
panying text. 
 122. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 38890 (1969) (uphold-
ing a federal requirement of equal broadcast time for opposing political posi-
tions based on a public need to allocate broadcast frequencies through public 
licenses). 
 123. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 65657 (1994) (ap-
plying a lesser standard of First Amendment scrutiny to a federal must carry 
requirement for cable systems based on cable operators control over a large 
populations access to an important source of information). 
 124. Eminent constitutional thinkers have cast the Supreme Courts com-
mitment to personal autonomy in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), dis-
cussed infra Part II.A, as a means of advancing democratic ideals. See Jane S. 
Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendments Democratic As-
pirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 734 (2004) (situating Law-
rence in a line of Fourteenth Amendment cases concerned with the culture 
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location is a necessary and proper subject for continual reas-
sessment.125 Understood functionally, however, political speech 
has both value and vulnerability distinct from those that attach 
to other categories of expression.126 Some legal impediments to 
personal autonomy reflect political power differentials, but 
many do not, and the fact that democratic participation re-
quires a measure of personal autonomy does not mean that all 
autonomy protections advance democratic deliberation. The 
public rights theory distinguishes the benefits of expression for 
democratic debate from its benefits for personal autonomy in 
order to ensure a functional, robust democratic system. The 
prospect of judicial determinations about the value of various 
forms of expression may appear troubling, but in this area, as 
in so many others, judges cannot decide anything without as-
sessing the values at stake.127 It is better to embody such  
 
 
and conditions of democracy); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 
1899 (2004) (positing that the commitments we make to our principles and to 
one another, in the context of associations ranging from the most intimate to 
those with the polity as a whole, constitute the essential core of constitutional-
ism). 
 125. See Post, supra note 104, at 111617 (positing the necessary inde-
terminacy of public discourse). My understanding of expressive freedom owes 
much to Posts rich account of the depth to which democratic principles require 
public contention to extend. See id. at 1116 (maintaining that public discourse 
must be conceptualized as an arena within which citizens are free continu-
ously to reconcile their differences and to (re)construct a distinctive and ever-
changing national identity). My difference with Post goes to his complete 
trust in the economic marketplace as the sole conceivable mechanism for en-
suring the freedom he extols. See id. at 111819 (rejecting involvement by 
public institutions in achieving the democratic aims of a Meiklejohn-derived 
First Amendment theory as [m]anagerial interference with the value of 
autonomy). Post dismisses what he identifies, in a term that still had bite in 
1993, as collectivist doubts about the public-private distinction and the 
autonomous character of individual decisions in our society on the circular ba-
sis that those doubts threaten the conception of democracy he wishes to sus-
tain. See id. at 112533. Posts dismissal ignores real threats that nongovern-
mental actors pose to democracy. It is far better to give courts a role in 
policing those actors than to let them police themselves. 
 126. See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 10515 (discussing 
the distinctive value and vulnerability of political debate compared to other 
speech). 
 127. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 913 (1979) (contending that judges are uniquely able to evaluate and 
balance competing constitutional values); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist 
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 711 (1931) (calling for a realist theory of 
values and recognizing many approaches to juristic truth). 
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evaluations in forthright, evolving doctrine than to pretend 
that they need not occur. 
2. Defying the Consensus to Protect Nonpolitical Speech 
The definitional problem aside, this Article addresses a 
deeper problem with confining expressive freedom under the 
First Amendment to political speech: the tension that pits the 
imperative to privilege politically valuable expression against 
ingrained judicial practice, social norms, and intellectual com-
mitments that compel undifferentiated First Amendment pro-
tection for most categories of speech. 
The public rights theory calls for privileging political 
speech under the First Amendment because political speech 
has unique value for democracy. Many people, however, believe 
all speech deserves an undifferentiated constitutional shield 
because all speech advances personal autonomy. That belief, 
which animates the private rights theorys directive to protect 
expression without regard to category, comports with the most 
common conception of constitutional rights. The impetus to 
protect individuals autonomous behavior against government 
intrusion, subject in appropriate cases to superseding govern-
ment regulatory interests, has deep roots in our legal tradition 
and exerts a powerful hold on our understanding.128 Autonomy 
strikes most people as especially salient for expressive freedom 
because the act of speaking manifests the moral agency that 
defines an individual in relation to other people and to the 
broader community.129 
The present Supreme Court has proclaimed unanimously 
the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amend-
ment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of 
his own message.130 Although the Court has done little to 
 
 128. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 122 n.4 (3d ed. rev., Callaghan & Co. 1884) (1765) (describing natural 
rights and the limited role of government in preserving liberty); JOHN LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 350 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (proposing that the individual is willing to 
yield some freedom to government in order to preserve the enjoyment of the 
property he has in [the state of nature]). 
 129. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 979, 101415 (1997) (substantiating the common intuition that recogni-
tion of individuals moral agency is essential to the formation of political com-
munity). 
 130. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 
515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
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elaborate the positive value of expressive autonomy, numerous 
First Amendment theorists have built sophisticated accounts of 
expressive freedom around personal autonomy. Charles Fried 
states the essential claim: Freedom of expression is properly 
based on autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be 
treated as an end in himself, an equal sovereign citizen of the 
kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible 
with the like liberties of all others.131 C. Edwin Baker main-
tains that courts should understand the First Amendment to 
protect all speech that represents the autonomous exercise of 
the speakers expressive capacity because of the way the pro-
tected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-
determination without improperly interfering with the legiti-
mate claims of others.132 Martin Redish posits that the Free 
Speech Clause serves entirely to advance the value of individ-
ual self-realization, which encompasses and supersedes the in-
terest in a healthy democratic process.133 
Some sorts of speech that have substantially or primarily 
nonpolitical value, notably pornography134 and commercial 
speech,135 defy consensus, leading to distinctly aberrant or in-
 
 131. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to 
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992). 
 132. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978); see also Baker, supra note 129, at 98287 (de-
scribing considerations of expressive autonomy that justify First Amendment 
protection of speech). Baker argues pointedly that the autonomy-based expla-
nation for expressive freedom is much more deeply intertwined with our nor-
mative commitments than the democracy-based explanation. See id. at 1014
17. 
 133. See Redish, supra note 104, at 60105 (explaining individual self-
realization value in relation to democratic process value); see also Post, supra 
note 104, at 1119 (conceptualizing autonomy as a value that dictates a sphere 
of expressive freedom within which heterogeneous versions of collective iden-
tity can be free continuously to collide and reconcile). 
 134. The incoherence of the Supreme Courts jurisprudence on pornography 
began with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court de-
fined a broad category of patently offensive sexually explicit speech by refer-
ence to community standards and declared the category outside the protec-
tion the First Amendment is supposed to accord to speech that offends the 
community. See id. at 24. In subsequent decisions, the Court effectively al-
lowed the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to ban scatological lan-
guage over the radio airwaves, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 
(1978), then struck down a congressional requirement that cable television 
providers scramble sexually explicit programming, see United States v. Play-
boy Entmt Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000). This Article discusses a sub-
stantive due process approach to regulations of pornography infra Part III.B. 
 135. The Supreme Court has had difficulty even defining commercial 
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coherent lines of First Amendment doctrine. But the Supreme 
Court has enforced a broad societal consensus that artistic and 
literary works deserve constitutional insulation from govern-
ment interference without regard to their contribution, or lack 
thereof, to political debate.136 Similarly, the Courts decisions 
reflect a broadly shared belief that the Constitution should pro-
tect categories of nonpolitical speech as varied as scientific in-
quiry,137 frank discussions about sex and sexuality,138 and 
charitable appeals.139 Thus, the Court has consistently ex-
tended full First Amendment protection to those categories of 
speech.140 
 
speech. Compare Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining commercial speech as speech which 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction (quoting Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Human Relations Commn, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))), with Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (de-
fining commercial speech more broadly to include expression related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience). The Courts approach 
to protecting commercial speech remains unstable and unsettled. Compare 
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (announcing a four-part intermediate scrutiny 
standard for commercial speech cases), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
land, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opinion) (maintaining that [t]he 
mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of 
itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to sup-
press them and proposing more thorough protection for commercial speech in 
certain circumstances). This Article discusses a substantive due process ap-
proach to regulations of commercial speech infra Part III.C. 
 136. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 11516 (1991) (striking down a state regulation 
that imposed a financial burden on criminals who published books relating to 
their crimes as invalid under the First Amendment). 
 137. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (including scientific value among the 
safe harbors that bring otherwise unprotected obscenity within First 
Amendment protection). 
 138. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997) (explaining that the 
Courts decision to invalidate a broad-based restriction on Internet content 
was partially based on the ground that the ban might encompass discussions 
about prison rape or safe sexual practices). 
 139. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 n.5 (1988) (determining that 
solicitation of charitable appeals for funds is within the protection of the First 
Amendment); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 444 U.S. 620, 
622 (1980) (holding that the First Amendment protects solicitation of contribu-
tions by charitable organizations). 
 140. I exclude religious expression from this list because the First Amend-
ment specially protects religious expression, as well as action, through the 
Free Exercise Clause, at least in theory. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 87682 (1990) (limiting the prohibitive effect of the Free Exer-
cise Clause to regulations that deliberately or discriminatorily burden relig-
ion). In fact, the Free Exercise Clause, by defining a basis for constitutional 
protection without distinguishing between speech and conduct, provides the 
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C. UNSATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO THE NONPOLITICAL SPEECH 
PROBLEM 
Prior advocates of the public rights theory have tried and 
failed to strike the delicate but necessary balance between pre-
serving the theorys essence and honoring the societal consen-
sus that nonpolitical speech deserves constitutional protection. 
These previous attempts have taken two principal forms: (1) 
expanding the category of political speech and (2) proposing al-
ternative sources of constitutional protection for nonpolitical 
speech. The first approach, although useful to some extent, 
cannot fully address the autonomy concern without undermin-
ing the method and purpose of the public rights theory. Past at-
tempts at the second approach have lacked force or coherence 
and have failed to embody the affirmative reasons why people 
favor constitutional protection of much nonpolitical speech. 
That second approach, however, points toward the newly viable 
substantive due process solution proposed in Part II. 
1. Expanding the Category of Political Speech 
When a categorical method of distributing some benefit 
loses support because it excludes popular or sympathetic bene-
ficiaries, a straightforward solution is available: expand the 
category. In party politics this is known as the big tent ap-
proach;141 in the public policy arena, inclusion of a vast range of 
middle-income beneficiaries in order to sell the Social Security 
Act in the 1930s illustrates the same principle.142 In the First 
Amendment context, the more speech that falls within a the-
orys privileged category of political speech, the broader the the-
orys appeal. 
The most important example of this approach in the public 
rights tradition is Meiklejohns treatment of artistic expression. 
Art appears to lie outside the range of Meiklejohns First 
Amendment; at a minimum, his disdain for entertainment me-
 
closest thing to an existing constitutional model for the extension of substan-
tive due process that this Article advocates. 
 141. See, e.g., KENNETH S. BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS 12021 (2000) 
(describing the Democratic Partys attempt to maintain an ideologically wide 
range of elected officials as a Big Tent approach). For a brief account of ma-
jor political parties tendency to moderate policy positions by building broad-
based coalitions, see Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 196162. 
 142. See DANIEL NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 205 (1969) (explain-
ing that securing political approval of the Social Security Act required ensur-
ing that the Act would benefit a broad group of constituencies). 
MAGARIAN_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM 
2005] DUE PROCESS AS PROTECTION FOR SPEECH 277 
 
dia suggests a refusal to attribute political value to artistic ex-
pression.143 However, in a later elaboration of his theory, Meik-
lejohn acknowledges that a vast array of idea and fact, of sci-
ence and fiction, of poetry and prose, of belief and doubt, of 
appreciation and purpose, of information and argument le-
gitimately contributes to citizens decisions about matters of 
public policy and thus warrants First Amendment protection.144 
Struggles with the conceptual limits of the public rights the-
orys coverage can generate important, constructive refine-
ments. Much artistic expression reflects political convictions 
and/or informs political debate, and further examination of the 
boundaries between political and nonpolitical speech will yield 
comparably sound insights about the political essence of other 
nominally nonpolitical expression.145 
As a strategy for making the public rights theory more pal-
atable, however, expanding the category of political speech con-
tains a fatal flaw. To whatever extent we broaden the class of 
protected speech, we simultaneously weaken the categorical 
methodology that defines the public rights theory. As Meik-
lejohn emphasizes, the First Amendment remains forever con-
fused and unintelligible unless we draw sharply and clearly the 
line which separates the public welfare of the community from 
the private goods of any individual citizen or group of citi-
zens.146 If we really believe, and can explain persuasively, that 
a given type of expression has political character, then admit-
ting that expression to the scope of First Amendment protec-
tion genuinely serves the interest in ensuring robust political 
debate. But we cannot reasonably hope that the categorical 
boundary of political expression extends to, or past, the point 
necessary to allay a critical mass of concerns about the theorys 
costs. Comprehensively reconciling the theorys scope with 
autonomy values by expanding the category of protected ex-
pression would inevitably require either conceptual gerryman-
dering or elision of any categorical boundary. Such compromise 
would fatally undermine the goal of deep protection for political  
 
 
 143. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 7980 (discussing private speech 
generally). This disdain appears especially vivid in Meiklejohns savage attack 
on commercial radio. See id. at 8688. 
 144. Id. at 117. 
 145. See supra notes 11827 and accompanying text (discussing the value 
of the ongoing dispute about the boundaries of politics). 
 146. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 7980. 
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speech, increasing pressure toward retaining a balancing ap-
proach that reduces political expression to the same stature as 
speech less integral to a healthy democracy. 
2. Finding Alternative Constitutional Protection for 
Nonpolitical Speech 
The failure of attempts to improve the public rights theory 
by expanding the category of political expression demonstrates 
that any effort to cure the theorys coverage deficit must main-
tain a conceptual distinction between political and nonpolitical 
speech. The surest way to protect different categories of expres-
sion while keeping them separate is to assign different consti-
tutional statuses to the respective categories. Leading public 
rights theorists, not surprisingly, have tried to do exactly that. 
Their ingenious efforts, while ultimately unsuccessful, provide 
a template for a more effective solution. 
Meiklejohns initial statement of the public rights theory 
appears to acknowledge the strategic risk of leaving substantial 
categories of speech unprotected. Even as he advocates limiting 
the scope of First Amendment protection to political speech and 
denigrates the importance of what he calls private speech, 
Meiklejohn offers an olive branch. Nonpolitical, private 
speech, while not entitled to the ironclad protection of the First 
Amendment, should still get constitutional protection as an as-
pect of the liberty secured by the procedural due process prin-
ciples of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.147 In other 
words, the government should enjoy discretion to restrict or 
punish nonpolitical speech, but not without offering notice and 
the possibility of a hearing. This approach, Meiklejohn argues, 
properly treats nonpolitical speech like ordinary conduct, re-
flecting the insight that the First Amendment elevates political 
speech to a special position.148 From a contemporary, strategic 
perspective, however, Meiklejohns treatment of nonpolitical 
speech amounts to dooming with faint protection. No one who 
disdains the public rights theory for its failure to protect a sub-
stantial amount of nonpolitical speech will warm to the theory 
upon assurance that the censors iron fist comes sheathed in a 
procedural velvet glove. 
Sunsteins version of alternative constitutional protection 
for nonpolitical speech appears, upon first glance, far more 
 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 80. 
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promising. In one of two alternative proposals for revising free 
speech doctrine, he advocates a two-tiered First Amend-
ment.149 Under this approach, the First Amendment would 
fully protect political speech; on the other hand, nonpolitical 
speech would get weaker First Amendment protection that 
would yield more readily to countervailing government inter-
ests.150 Sunstein justifies this approach by maintaining that the 
Court already accords special protection to political speech 
while denying or limiting First Amendment protection as to 
several categories of nonpolitical expression: obscenity, com-
mercial speech, and libel of private persons.151 Moreover, he 
notes, the Court treats numerous other instances of nonpoliti-
cal speechconspiracies, purely verbal workplace harassment, 
bribery, and threatsas if they are not speech at all for First 
Amendment purposes.152 Given these existing doctrines, Sun-
stein argues, an explicit shift to a two-tiered First Amendment 
would merely ratify our active intuitions about the need to 
treat different categories of speech differently. 
Although Sunstein appears to offer greater assurances to 
skeptics of the public rights theory who fear for the safety of 
nonpolitical speech, those assurances ultimately lack sub-
stance. First, nothing in the text, structure, or history of the 
Constitution provides a basis for bifurcating the First Amend-
ment. Unlike Meiklejohns elaboration of the public rights the-
ory, which anticipates and addresses originalist and textualist 
critiques,153 Sunsteins two-tiered First Amendment is nothing 
more than a convenient invention. In relying on the claim that 
the Court has already moved toward a two-tiered First 
Amendment, Sunstein makes the mistake of building a doctrine 
 
 149. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 30115 (arguing for primacy of poli-
tics in First Amendment theory). Sunsteins alternative proposal, which he 
calls a New Deal for speech, emphasizes the politically determined nature of 
expressive opportunities and advocates government regulation to improve the 
flow of ideas. See id. at 263300. The public rights theory of expressive free-
dom contains elements in common with each of Sunsteins approaches. See su-
pra notes 1427 and accompanying text (describing the public rights theory). 
 150. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 306 (arguing that government should 
be under a special burden of justification when it seeks to control speech in-
tended and received as a contribution to public deliberation). 
 151. See id. at 302. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 1972 (describing the tex-
tual genesis of Meiklejohns First Amendment theory as the paradox of the 
First Amendments absolutist language but necessarily limited effect). 
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on disparate rules that he concedes lack a clear principle.154 
In addition, the argument from existing practice contradicts 
Sunsteins own normative precept for advocating change in 
First Amendment theory: that the Court is insufficiently pro-
tecting political speech while overprotecting less deserving 
categories of expression.155 Second, and accordingly, the sub-
stance of Sunsteins two-tiered First Amendment derives from 
nothing more than his own normative priorities: the objection 
to giving such unworthies as stock prospectuses, pornography, 
1-900 numbers, large political expenditures, and network tele-
vision programs First Amendment pride of place.156 Sunsteins 
bifurcation of the First Amendment creates a structural facade 
for his subjective preferences. 
Beyond these problems, Meiklejohns and Sunsteins at-
tempts to relocate protection for nonpolitical speech share a fi-
nal, essential flaw. Neither approach addresses the basic source 
of discomfort with the public rights theory: that the Constitu-
tion should protect nonpolitical speech as a matter of right be-
cause people should be entitled to speak as their autonomous 
choices dictate.157 This flaw follows naturally from each theo-
rists open rejection of autonomy as a justification for protecting 
speech. Meiklejohn sharply criticizes an American Individual-
ism whose excesses have weakened and riddled our under-
standing of the meaning of intellectual freedom.158 Accord-
ingly, his procedural due process approach manifestly treats 
nonpolitical speech like ordinary, unprivileged behavior and 
merely acknowledges the procedural limits the Constitution 
places on every government regulation. Sunstein maintains 
that an approach rooted in the norm of autonomy makes it dif-
ficult to understand what is special about speech.159 Accord-
ingly, although he formally treats nonpolitical speech as a mat-
ter of right, he too fails to offer any affirmative explanation 
why nonpolitical speech deserves constitutional protection. 
Both Meiklejohn and Sunstein rhetorically diminish speech  
 
 
 154. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 302. 
 155. See id. at 258 (contrasting early First Amendment decisions that pro-
tected political dissenters rights with contemporary decisions that protect the 
rights of various private and corporate interests). 
 156. See id. 
 157. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 158. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 72. 
 159. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 304. 
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whose primary value goes to personal autonomy, treating such 
speech as a second-class constitutional citizen that can only try 
to squeeze under the edge of the protective umbrella that 
shields political speech. 
These defects in previous attempts to locate alternative 
constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech appear inevi-
table because, until recently, nothing in constitutional doctrine 
suggested any affirmative basis for meaningfully protecting 
nonpolitical expression without resort to a private rights ac-
count of the First Amendment. In 2003, however, the Supreme 
Court provided an opening for a robust alternative source of 
constitutional protection for nonpolitical expression: substan-
tive due process. Understanding how substantive due process 
doctrine can accommodate nonpolitical speech protection re-
quires an examination of how the Supreme Courts most recent 
statement on substantive due process departs from previous 
law. 
II.  THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS SOLUTION TO THE 
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH PROBLEM 
The substantive element of the Fifth160 and Fourteenth 
Amendments Due Process Clauses161 has provided the most 
important constitutional opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
adjust the uneasy balance between majoritarian preferences, as 
expressed in legislative choices, and deeply rooted minority in-
terests.162 Although substantive due process doctrine lacks a 
straightforward foundation in the constitutional text, its resil-
ience over time testifies to our legal systems deeply rooted in- 
 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. Substantive due process doctrine 
has developed primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment, which by its 
terms applies only to the states. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 
(1973) (striking down a states restrictions on abortion under the Fourteenth 
Amendments Due Process Clause). The Supreme Court has extended substan-
tive due process principles to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendments Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301
02 (1993) (noting the availability of a substantive due process claim under the 
Fifth Amendment). 
 162. The substantive due process doctrine has generated an enormous body 
of scholarship. For a useful recent discussion and taxonomy, see Peter J. 
Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural 
Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 84149 (2003) 
(emphasizing distinctions among the strands of substantive due process doc-
trine). 
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sight that a constitutional culture of individual rights must ac-
commodate substantive protections of essential human activi-
ties. Even as the doctrine has taken root, however, the Su-
preme Court has made clear that the potentially sweeping 
character and necessarily uncertain judicial explication of sub-
stantive due process163 require judges to balance the impor-
tance for individuals of protected conduct against significant 
government grounds for regulating that conduct.164 Thus, the 
twin challenges of substantive due process jurisprudence have 
been to articulate a theoretical basis for unenumerated sub-
stantive rights and to identify the nature of government inter-
ests that can properly trump those rights. 
The Courts most recent substantive due process decision, 
Lawrence v. Texas,165 takes up both of those challenges, provid-
ing important guidelines for the further development of sub-
stantive due process. Lawrence earned its landmark status by 
striking down all state restrictions on sodomy between con-
senting adults as violations of substantive due process.166 The 
Court held that the Constitution precluded state efforts to de-
fine the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its 
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution 
the law protects.167 Two pillars of the Lawrence majoritys rea-
soning portend sweeping changes beyond the scope of sodomy  
 
 
 
 163. The great cautionary tale of substantive due process, of course, is the 
Courts wholesale usurpation of the elected branches regulatory prerogatives 
through the economic substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era. 
Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (asserting broad judicial 
power to protect a laissez-faire right to contract against government regula-
tion), with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 53839 (1934) (essentially dis-
avowing the Lochner doctrine as improperly invasive of majoritarian preroga-
tives). 
 164. The Court initially implemented this balance, in cases of fundamen-
tal rights, through strict scrutiny. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 15556 (subjecting 
state restrictions on access to abortion to strict scrutiny). More recently in the 
abortion context, the Court has adjusted the balance in the governments favor 
by replacing strict scrutiny with an inquiry into whether the challenged gov-
ernment action places an undue burden on the abortion right. See Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(replacing strict scrutiny with an undue burden standard). To date, the Court 
has not applied the undue burden standard in any other substantive due proc-
ess context. 
 165. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 166. See id. at 57879. 
 167. Id. at 567. 
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laws or even regulations of sexual behavior generally. First, as 
to the basis of substantive due process rights, the Court articu-
lated an expansive theory of personal autonomy as the essen-
tial value that substantive due process safeguards.168 Second, 
as to the nature of superseding government interests, the Court 
discredited government restrictions on protected conduct that 
derive from purely moral justifications unrelated to potential 
harms to unwilling third parties.169 
These two principles of Lawrence have great salience for a 
problem that no one has previously associated with substantive 
due process: the Constitutions protection of nonpolitical 
speech.170 Lawrence affords the Court an opportunity to trans-
plant constitutional speech protection directed at preserving 
personal autonomy, rather than collective political decision 
making, from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause. 
Such a shift would satisfy our deep convictions about the im-
portance of preserving a constitutional safeguard for all expres-
sion that advances personal autonomy. It would also create a 
more coherent basis for assessing the social trade-offs at stake 
in government regulation of nonpolitical speech. At the same 
time, it would enable the Court, consistent with the public 
rights theory, to preserve the First Amendments Free Speech 
Clause as a virtually absolute shield against regulations that 
undermine politically salient expression. 
 
 168. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 169. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 170. Other accounts of Lawrence have noted in passing that the Courts 
sense of substantive due process resonates with First Amendment rhetoric. 
See Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Poten-
tial in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 78 (2003) (sug-
gesting that Lawrence makes substantive due process more like First Amend-
ment speech protection by transforming it into a subjective, abstract 
principle); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 
1107 (2004) (describing associational freedom as a predicate for identity 
formation within the realm of substantive due process); Tribe, supra note 124, 
at 1932 (noting the similarity between Lawrences analysis and the First 
Amendments prohibition on certain grounds for government regulation). In 
addition, of course, the Due Process Clause has long protected a great deal of 
speech through its incorporation of the First Amendments protections. See 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that freedom of speech 
and of the presswhich are protected by the First Amendment from abridg-
ment by Congressare among the fundamental personal rights and liberties 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from im-
pairment by the States); Rubin, supra note 162, at 842 (discussing incorpora-
tion as a species of substantive due process doctrine). 
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A. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE NEW DAWN OF SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS PROTECTION 
Prior to Lawrence, the Supreme Courts enthusiasm for 
protecting substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
appeared marginal at best. Substantive due process doctrine 
had reached its recent high water marks in the Courts tepid 
reaffirmation of the right to abortion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey171 and indications from a 
splintered majority of Justices in Washington v. Glucksberg 
that the Due Process Clause might, in extreme circumstances, 
support a right to physician-assisted suicide.172 But the Court 
had declined invitations to extend the substantive due process 
principle to new rights after Roe v. Wade,173 harshly rejecting 
claims for due process rights to parental visitation in Michael 
H. v. Gerald D.,174 to sexual autonomy in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,175 and to a right to die with dignity in Glucksberg.176 
 
 171. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians 
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986) (striking down provisions of a 
states abortion law because they wholly subordinate constitutional privacy 
interests and concerns with maternal health in an effort to deter a woman 
from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make), overruled 
in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 870, 88283. 
 172. See 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (OConnor, J., concurring) (leaving open 
the question of whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing 
great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the cir-
cumstances of his or her imminent death); id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgments) (finding room for further debate about the limits that the 
Constitution places on the power of the States to punish physician-assisted 
suicide); id. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgments) (stating that the 
importance of the individual interest here, as within that class of certain in-
terests demanding careful scrutiny of the States contrary claim cannot be 
gainsaid but reserving judgment on the question [w]hether that interest 
might in some circumstances, or at some time, be seen as fundamental to the 
degree entitled to prevail) (citation omitted). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
joined Justice OConnors concurrence in substance. See id. at 736; see also 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (upholding a 
state court decision that required a familys discontinuation of a daughters 
life-sustaining treatment to be supported by clear and convincing evidence of 
her wishes). 
 173. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing womens reproductive freedom 
as part of the privacy rights inherent in due process). 
 174. 491 U.S. 110, 12427 (1989) (rejecting a biological fathers claimed 
right to visit his child, who was in the custody of the childs biological mother 
and adoptive father). 
 175. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (rejecting the argument that the Due Process 
Clause conferred a fundamental right to engage in consensual gay sex), over-
ruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 176. 521 U.S. at 728. 
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Lawrence dramatically shifted the tide, reinvigorating substan-
tive due process both by sharpening the doctrines affirmative 
rationale and by tightening the restrictions it imposes on gov-
ernment regulation. 
1. Substantive Due Process as a Guarantor of Personal 
Autonomy 
First, Justice Kennedys Lawrence opinion makes the 
Courts strongest statement to date on the roots of substantive 
due process doctrine in the personal right to live and behave 
autonomously.177 The idea that substantive due process pro-
tects individuals right to make autonomous decisions about 
matters central to their lives and identities is hardly novel. Be-
ginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court rooted modern, 
noneconomic substantive due process in personal privacy,178 a 
concept closely related to autonomy. Griswold linked substan-
tive due process protection to the marital relationship,179 but 
Justice Brennan, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,180 moved toward an 
individualized notion of personal autonomy. If the right of pri-
vacy means anything, he wrote for the Court, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
 
 177. The Lawrence Courts concept of individual autonomy integrates 
strong concerns with both relative equality of treatment and interactions 
among different people and groups. See Hunter, supra note 170, at 1134 (argu-
ing that Lawrence reflects an appreciation of the mutual reinforcement of 
equality and liberty principles); David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 48085 (casting Lawrence as a family privacy 
decision); Schacter, supra note 124, at 74951 (suggesting that Lawrence com-
bines notions of liberty and equality with special emphasis on interpersonal 
relationships); Tribe, supra note 124, at 1898 (arguing that Lawrence both 
presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and relationally-
situated theory of substantive liberty). 
 178. See 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (The present case, then, concerns a rela-
tionship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees.). 
 179. See id. at 48586 (basing the Courts decision to strike down a state 
contraceptive ban on notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relation-
ship). In emphasizing the family relationship, the Griswold Court followed 
the pattern of two cases from the 1920s, often cited as precursors of non-
economic substantive due process, in which the Court struck down restrictions 
on parents decisions about how to educate their children. See Pierce v. Socy of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 53435 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 
(1923). 
 180. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.181 
The seeds of personal autonomy in Eisenstadt bore doctrinal 
fruit when the Court, in Roe v. Wade, affirmed womens due 
process right to receive abortions.182 The Roe Court appeared to 
embrace the idea that the Due Process Clause protected peo-
ples right to make intimately personal decisions without gov-
ernment interference.183 
Eisenstadt, however, came to represent a road not taken. 
Beginning with its emphatic approval in Bowers v. Hardwick of 
state prohibitions on sodomy, the Court appeared to abandon 
the idea that substantive due process embodies broad constitu-
tional protection for personal autonomy.184 The key substantive 
due process decisions that followed Bowers neither recanted its 
restrictive reasoning nor offered much hope that the Court 
would restore a robust concept of personal autonomy to the cen-
ter of due process jurisprudence. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
Justice Scalias opinion upholding a state presumption of le-
gitimacy for children born in wedlock disdained any broad no-
tion of liberty in favor of deference to traditions of state law.185 
Although the declaration of the plurality in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that the heart of 
liberty harbored the right to define ones own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life186 anticipated Lawrence rhetorically, the rhetoric rang hol-
low as the Casey plurality permitted states to restrict abortion 
 
 181. Id. at 453. 
 182. 410 U.S. 113, 16467 (1973). 
 183. See id. at 15253; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 
678, 68486, 699 (1977) (plurality opinion) (invoking the Due Process Clause 
to strike down a state statute that banned the sale of contraceptives to mi-
nors). 
 184. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (complaining that despite the language of 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which ap-
pears to focus only on the processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken, 
the cases are legion in which those Clauses have been interpreted to have sub-
stantive content and declaring that many of the Courts noneconomic sub-
stantive due process decisions have little or no textual support in the consti-
tutional language), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 185. See 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (What counts is whether the States in 
fact award substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child con-
ceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace 
the child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that has done so. This 
is not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are 
made.). 
 186. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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rights through enforced waiting periods accompanied by man-
datory information designed to discourage abortions187 and pa-
rental consent schemes for minors who sought abortions.188 
Chief Justice Rehnquists opinion for the Court in Washington 
v. Glucksberg came close to disdaining substantive due process 
altogether, emphasizing the supposed analytic perils of extend-
ing the doctrine and reiterating the Michael H. conception of 
tradition-bound due process jurisprudence.189 
Lawrence revitalizes the Eisenstadt idea of personal auton-
omy and makes it the basis of a momentous decision that boldly 
overrules Bowers and enshrines in constitutional law the sex-
ual freedom of gay men and lesbians. Justice Kennedy begins 
his Lawrence analysis by defining liberty, the central value in 
substantive due process doctrine,190 in terms of autonomy: 
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of 
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.191 
The majority rejects the proposition that substantive due proc-
ess protection requires a specific basis in tradition.192 In appre-
hending the issue before the Court, Justice Kennedy rebukes 
the view of Bowers that sodomy laws merely implicate the 
right to engage in certain sexual conduct.193 That formulation 
of the question, Justice Kennedy insists, trivializes the interest 
of people subject to liability for violating sodomy prohibi-
tions.194 He posits a much broader interest at stake in substan-
tive due process challenges to state restrictions on intimate be-
havior: the autonomy of the person in making personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-
 
 187. See id. at 882 (upholding against due process challenge Pennsyl-
vanias informed consent requirement for abortions). 
 188. See id. at 899 (upholding against due process challenge Pennsyl-
vanias parental consent requirement for minors who seek abortions). 
 189. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72021 (1997) (We must 
therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new 
ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be 
subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 190. See Hunter, supra note 170, at 110607 (suggesting that Lawrence re-
places privacy with liberty as the principle behind substantive due process). 
 191. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 192. See id. at 571. The majority leaves dissenting Justice Scalia to wave 
the faded flag of his tradition-specific approach. See id. at 59293 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 567 (majority opinion). 
 194. See id. 
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ily relationships, child rearing, and education.195 A restriction 
on the sexual practices of consenting adults represents an effort 
by the state to demean their existence [and] control their des-
tiny.196 For the Lawrence Court, substantive due process pro-
tects not a mere descriptive activity but rather a normative 
valuethat of personal autonomy. 
2. The Inadequacy of Purely Moral Justifications for Limits on 
Personal Autonomy 
A second defining feature of Lawrence is the Courts will-
ingness to embrace a logical implication of noneconomic sub-
stantive due process doctrine that it previously avoided: gov-
ernment may not restrict or punish personal decisions based 
purely on moral disapproval.197 The Courts rejection of the es-
sentially moral regulations in Griswold,198 Eisenstadt,199 and 
Roe200 appeared to reflect an understanding that a states im-
posing its moral judgments on individuals intimate personal 
decisions effectively negates personal autonomy. Subsequent 
decisions, however, gave substantial deference to states purely 
moral grounds for limiting personal autonomy. The Bowers 
Court insisted that the law . . . is constantly based on notions 
 
 195. Id. at 574. 
 196. Id. at 578. 
 197. Commentators have noted this feature of Lawrence. See Huhn, supra 
note 170, at 9092; Hunter, supra note 170, at 1112; Schacter, supra note 124, 
at 740. But see Andrew Koppelman, Lawrences Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1171, 117576 (2004) (arguing that the Lawrence Court simply found the 
states moral interest insufficient to outweigh the liberty interest at stake). 
Professor Tribe argues that the rejection of moral regulation in Lawrence ex-
tends only to regulations that burden associational rights. See Tribe, supra 
note 124, at 193536. The basis and scope of that asserted limit, however, re-
main unclear. Another potential limit on the decisions rejection of moral regu-
lation stems from the fact that the sodomy statutes at issue in Lawrence car-
ried criminal penalties. Nothing in the opinion, however, limits the Courts 
reasoning to criminal regulations, and Lawrence seems highly salient for non-
criminal regulations that seriously burden personal autonomy. 
 198. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) ([I]t is clear that the state interest in safeguarding marital fidel-
ity can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which does not, 
like the present one, sweep unnecessarily broadly . . . .). 
 199. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (rejecting deter-
rence of premarital sex as a reasonable justification for a law that banned 
giving contraceptives to unmarried persons). 
 200. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) ([W]e do not agree that, by 
adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant 
woman that are at stake.). 
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of morality and practically ridiculed the notion of due process 
scrutiny for all laws representing essentially moral choices.201 
The Casey plurality predicated its revision of the Roe abortion 
right on heightened solicitude for the governments interest in 
protection of potential life.202 In particular, the plurality com-
promised its emphasis on pregnant womens decisional auton-
omy in deference to the spouse, family, and society which must 
confront the knowledge that [abortion] procedures exist, proce-
dures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against in-
nocent human life.203 Although the plurality included this in-
terest among consequences of abortion,204 it made no effort to 
explain how purely moral disapproval of the procedure could 
carry anything more than a purely moral consequence. Like-
wise, the Glucksberg Court counted among the important and 
legitimate government interests that justified state bans on 
physician-assisted suicide the symbolic and aspirational as 
well as practical desire to preserve human life.205 
Lawrence reverses the tendency to approve purely moral 
regulations by adopting perhaps the farthest-reaching lan-
guage from Justice Stevenss dissenting opinion in Bowers: 
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has tradition-
ally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.206 Justice 
Kennedy underscores the rejection of purely moral regulation 
in his justification for overruling Bowers. Contrasting that de-
parture from stare decisis with the Courts adherence to prece-
dent in Casey,207 he explains that there has been no individual 
 
 201. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 578. 
 202. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). Of 
course, the question whether the governments interest in protecting potential 
life implicates harm to a third party defines the philosophical frontiers of the 
abortion debate. However, a Court committed to prohibiting purely moral 
regulation would have needed, at a minimum, to acknowledge its inability to 
resolve that question. 
 203. Id. at 852. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72829 (1997) (plurality 
opinion) (describing the states unqualified interest in the preservation of 
human life (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 
(1990))); see also id. at 746 (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing the govern-
ment interest in the sanctity of life). 
 206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting)). 
 207. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 86061 (explaining the importance of adhering 
MAGARIAN_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM 
290 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:247 
 
or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel 
against overturning its holding once there are compelling rea-
sons to do so.208 However, as Justice Scalia correctly points out 
in dissent, many people relied extensively on Bowers if one 
treats a governing majoritys belief that certain sexual behav-
ior is immoral and unacceptable as a cognizable basis for a re-
liance interest.209 Justice Kennedy also contrasts the consen-
sual activity that sodomy prohibitions restrict with conduct 
that involves minors or persons who might be injured or co-
erced or who are situated in relationships where consent might 
not easily be refused and with public conduct or prostitu-
tion.210 Those distinctions imply that the state legitimately 
may restrict personal autonomy only where the autonomous 
decision or conduct at issue harm third parties or the public.211 
Justice Scalia casts the majoritys distinctions into even 
sharper relief by insisting that Lawrence undermines all state 
prohibitions of bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, pros-
titution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and ob-
scenity because such prohibitions are sustainable only in light 
of Bowers validation of laws based on moral choices.212 
The Lawrence majoritys rejection of purely moral justifica-
tions for state restrictions on important decisions situates the 
Court in a long and distinguished line of critics of moral regula-
tion. In John Stuart Mills famous formulation, the only pur-
pose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any mem-
ber of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
 
to precedent in the abortion context). 
 208. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 209. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196). 
 210. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
 211. Justice OConnors opinion concurring in the judgment in Lawrence, 
which relies on the narrower ground of the Equal Protection Clause, echoes 
the majoritys criticism of purely moral regulation in the context of legal dis-
tinctions among groups of people. For Justice OConnor, [m]oral disapproval 
of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because legal classifications must not be drawn for the purpose 
of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. Id. at 583 (OConnor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996)). 
 212. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 599 (repeating the 
charge). Wilson Huhn makes the interesting observation that Justice Scalia 
and the Court display clashing visions of morality, with Justice Scalia insist-
ing on mandatory rules where the majority views decisional autonomy as a 
predicate for morally viable personal choices. See Huhn, supra note 170, at 91
93. 
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harm to others.213 This harm principle is a familiar, and 
much debated, idea in liberal democratic theory.214 In the sub-
stantive due process context, the principle mandates that only 
the potential for harm to unwilling third parties can justify re-
straints on intimate personal decisions.215 Justice Kennedy in 
Lawrence holds that due process bars attempts by the State, or 
a court, to define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to 
set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an insti-
tution the law protects.216 Acknowledging the moral basis for 
the Bowers decision, he specifically rejects the idea that the 
majority may use the power of the State to enforce [moral] 
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal 
law.217 This understanding departs dramatically not only from 
Bowers but also from Casey and Glucksberg.218 The Lawrence 
majoritys embrace of the harm principle follows naturally from 
its positive emphasis on personal autonomy. If the Constitution 
protects peoples prerogatives to live their lives as they see fit, 
then government interference with an individuals decisions 
about matters central to personal autonomy can only be just if 
necessary to protect some other persons concrete interest. 
 
 213. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Alburey Castell ed., Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc. 1947) (1859). 
 214. The classic exchange in the past half-century about the legitimacy of 
purely moral justifications for constraints on autonomy is the Hart-Devlin de-
bate. Compare H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (advocating 
the harm principle), with PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 
(1975) (defending morality-based regulation). 
 215. David Meyer argues that reading Lawrence as having embraced the 
harm principle threatens to undermine the ways in which moral conceptions of 
family relationships have contributed to socially beneficial family relation-
ships. See Meyer, supra note 177, at 477. Although Meyer identifies values 
worth protecting, his concern rests on an unduly positive presumption about 
the effects of majoritarian morality on human flourishing; overestimates the 
ability of substantive due process doctrine to constrain affirmative government 
initiatives designed to accomplish social policy goals, such as spending pro-
grams and public information campaigns; and underestimates the scope of le-
gally cognizable harm under the harm principle. 
 216. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. Justice Kennedy notes that 19th-century 
sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations between men and minor girls 
or minor boys, relations between adults involving force, relations between 
adults implicating disparity in status, or relations between men and animals. 
Id. at 569. In contrast, [t]he present case does not involve minors. It does not 
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in rela-
tionships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution. Id. at 578. 
 217. Id. at 571. 
 218. See supra notes 20105 and accompanying text. 
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B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND NONPOLITICAL SPEECH 
The Courts reasoning in Lawrence enables a fundamental 
revision of constitutional free speech doctrine. The Lawrence 
account of substantive due process does not merely echo the 
private rights theorys call to protect speech in the name of per-
sonal autonomy;219 rather, Lawrence gives that imperative a 
more comfortable home in substantive due process than it pres-
ently enjoys in the First Amendment. The Court should take 
this opportunity to shift the basis for constitutional protection 
of speech whose primary value goes to personal autonomy from 
the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause.220 Under this 
approach, the Court in nonpolitical speech cases would balance 
the value of the burdened speech for some persons or persons 
autonomy against the concrete harm the speech threatened to 
third parties. Complementing that change, the Court should 
limit the scope of First Amendment expressive freedom to 
speech whose primary value goes to political discourse. 
These two doctrinal moves would bring several related 
benefits. Judicial analysis of nonpolitical speech regulations 
would gain coherence and force through explicit focus on the 
personal autonomy value of speech claims and the credibility of 
government submissions about harm from expression. Nonpoli-
tical speech would enjoy substantial constitutional protection, 
with the strongest protection attaching to the speech claims 
that most forcefully served the societal consensus to protect 
personal autonomy. Meanwhile, political speech would gain the 
deep First Amendment protection that Meiklejohn envisioned,  
 
 
 219. See supra notes 26 (discussing the private rights theorys emphasis 
on personal autonomy as a basis for constitutional protection of speech). 
 220. One practical concern about this shift is that the Court only recently 
decided Lawrence, and nonpolitical speech protection is too important to be 
predicated on a freshly minted precedent in a volatile area of law. Following 
this Articles prescription, however, should diminish the likelihood that a later 
Court would undermine Lawrence, both because my proposal would expand 
the practical scope of substantive due process and because the proposal rests 
on an account of Lawrence that should firmly ground the decision as prece-
dent. Even if the Court did adopt my proposal and then, at some later time, 
weaken or abandon Lawrence, it presumably would restore nonpolitical speech 
protection to the First Amendment, because such a retrenchment would repre-
sent, among other things, a rejection of this Articles case for treating nonpoli-
tical speech as a matter of substantive due process rather than a First 
Amendment concern. In addition, as I discuss infra Part III, present First 
Amendment protection for nonpolitical speech is hardly so ironclad or firmly 
grounded as to render my proposal inordinately risky by comparison. 
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free from the balancing against government regulatory inter-
ests appropriate for speech claims less salient to our Constitu-
tions central democratic aspirations.221 
The two key features of the Lawrence opinion discussed in 
the previous sectionemphasis on personal autonomy as the 
driving force behind substantive due process and rejection of 
purely moral regulation in favor of the harm principlemake 
the Due Process Clause a viable source of constitutional protec-
tion for nonpolitical speech. 
First, the Lawrence Courts emphasis on personal auton-
omys centrality to constitutional rights resonates strongly with 
the private rights theory of expressive freedom and thus with 
much contemporary free speech doctrine. Under the private 
rights theory, the Constitution ensures expressive freedom be-
cause expression is an essential vehicle through which indi-
viduals advance their interests, and government interference 
with expression accordingly cuts to the heart of personal 
autonomy. Substantive due process, as conceptualized in Law-
rence, deepens and elaborates on that understanding, expand-
ing it to encompass all manner of self-actualizing behavior. 
Moreover, the idea of autonomy revived and strengthened in 
Lawrence reflects particular concern with personal freedom to 
conduct intimate interpersonal relationships, a concern that 
parallels the necessary emphasis of speech protection on com-
munication and association between and among people.222 
Prior to Lawrence, the Courts tentative, contingent linkage 
of personal autonomy with substantive due process was too 
weak to provide a bridge between due process and free speech 
doctrines.223 In contrast, the Lawrence Courts account of per-
sonal autonomys centrality to substantive due process echoes 
and sharpens the reasoning of decisions that protect expression 
because of its autonomy value. Just as Lawrence emphasizes 
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct,224 the Courts free 
speech jurisprudence emphasizes the contribution speech 
 
 221. See supra notes 1518 and accompanying text (discussing the public 
rights theorys advocacy of categorical protection, rather than balancing, for 
political speech). 
 222. See Tribe, supra note 124, at 193940 (identifying speech and the 
peaceful commingling of separate selves [as] facets of the eternal quest for . . . 
exchanging emotions, values, and ideas). 
 223. See supra notes 18489 and accompanying text. 
 224. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
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makes to personal autonomy.225 Justice Kennedys libertarian 
rhetoric in Lawrence echoes his First Amendment opinions, 
which strongly reflect the private rights theory of expressive 
freedom.226 Justice Kennedy has even noted affinities between 
substantive due process and the autonomy concerns that un-
dergird the private rights theory of expressive freedom, sug-
gesting that early twentieth-century due process decisions that 
protect parents decisions about child-rearing, had they been 
decided in recent times, may well have been grounded upon 
First Amendment principles.227 
Second, the Lawrence Courts embrace of the harm princi-
ple closely parallels free speech doctrines emphasis on the im-
permissibility of regulation. Disdain for purely moral regula-
tion features prominently in First Amendment doctrine, 
generating free speech laws core directive against regulations 
of expression that reflect the governments normative disap-
proval of the speakers ideas.228 Judges and scholars who dis-
agree about other elements of First Amendment theory gener-
ally agree that the worst affront to expressive freedom is 
regulation that censors or punishes a particular viewpoint.229 
The Supreme Courts rejection of viewpoint-based regulation 
even within the boundaries of speech unprotected by the First 
 
 225. See supra notes 213 and accompanying text. 
 226. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J.) (At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that 
each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving 
of expression, consideration, and adherence.). 
 227. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (discussing Pierce v. Socy 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 53435 (1925) (plurality opinion), and Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)). 
 228. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
82829 (1995) (It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech 
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys . . . . Viewpoint dis-
crimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.); Members of 
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (The gen-
eral principle . . . is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regu-
late speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of oth-
ers.); Police Dept v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ([A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.). 
 229. Compare MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 26 (positing as the vital 
point of free speech theory that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a 
hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than another), with Fried, 
supra note 131, at 225 (Government may not suppress or regulate speech be-
cause it does not like its content . . . . If government regulates the time, place 
or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take sides be-
tween competing ideas.). 
MAGARIAN_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM 
2005] DUE PROCESS AS PROTECTION FOR SPEECH 295 
 
Amendment indicates the fundamental incompatibility of con-
stitutional speech protection with majoritarian judgments 
about the quality of competing ideas.230 Whereas prohibiting 
purely moral regulation marks a bold step for regulations of 
sexual behavior, that prohibition already pervades the law ap-
plied to restrictions on speech and expressive conduct. 
Prior to Lawrence, the Courts substantive due process doc-
trine too easily tolerated purely moral regulation, precluding a 
bridge between due process and free speech principles.231 In-
voking substantive due process as a ground for protecting ex-
pression would have permitted many government regulations 
of speech based on majoritarian preferences, a notion intoler-
able to First Amendment doctrine. But the Lawrence Courts 
account of permissible grounds for regulation, like its auton-
omy-based justification of due process rights, harmonizes sub-
stantive due process doctrine with familiar principles of expres-
sive freedom.232 The harm principle of Lawrence replicates the 
most substantial reason for limiting speech protection in some 
instances: that the speech in question will cause concrete 
harm.233 One of the public rights theorys core principles is that 
 
 230. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (accepting the 
assumption that a municipal ordinance prohibiting the display of objects in-
tended to arouse anger or alarm restricted only unprotected fighting words 
but nonetheless striking down the ordinance under the First Amendment). For 
a discussion of R.A.V. as an exemplar of rights doctrines focus on preventing 
improperly motivated regulations, see Tribe, supra note 124, at 193233. See 
also Hunter, supra note 170, at 111516 (noting the Lawrence Courts empha-
sis on the legitimacy of the governments ground for regulation). 
 231. See supra notes 20105 and accompanying text. 
 232. Professor Baker advances a distinctively robust autonomy-centered 
theory of expressive freedom, arguing that harm should not justify regulation 
of speech because the autonomy values he views as justifying speech protec-
tion supersede societys interest in preventing harm. See Baker, supra note 
129, at 992. Bakers argument appears to depend on the idea that speech is a 
distinctive exercise of liberty, a notion that further depends on his concep-
tion of speech as operating nonviolently and noncoercively. See id. at 986 (de-
fining protected expression). Baker fails to distinguish speech from action that 
similarly advances liberty without resort to coercion and violence or, in the 
alternative, to sufficiently distinguish harmful effects of speech from coercive 
or violent effects. Thomas Scanlon parses the appropriate role of harm in 
speech regulation more persuasively. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Free-
dom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 20922 (1972). He distinguishes 
regulations that seek to prevent persuasion to do harm, which Scanlons free 
speech theory presumptively would bar, from regulations that seek to prevent 
speech that materially assists in the commission of harmful acts, which Scan-
lon presumptively would allow. See id. 
 233. The harm principle stands behind most of the Supreme Courts exclu-
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fear of harm has no salience in political speech cases, except in 
circumstances where the speech at issue threatens to render 
debate itself impossible.234 Lawrence allows that principle to 
stand under the First Amendment while providing a sensible 
guideline for balancing in nonpolitical speech cases. 
Enlisting substantive due process to protect nonpolitical 
speech would improve upon present free speech doctrine by 
employing a different, more theoretically coherent constitu-
tional principle to trigger searching judicial review of burdens 
on speech that primarily advances personal autonomy rather 
than political discourse. Under present First Amendment doc-
trine, which encompasses political and nonpolitical speech, a 
court will subject a regulation to heightened scrutiny simply 
because the regulation targets or burdens an activity classified 
as expressive. In contrast, a Lawrence-derived substantive due 
process shield for nonpolitical speech would subject a regula-
tion of such speech to searching judicial review because the 
speech advanced personal autonomy. This linkage does not im-
ply that all expression is entitled to substantive due process 
protection, nor does it obscure the Courts established commit-
ment to protecting various kinds of nonexpressive conduct un-
der the Due Process Clause.235 Rather, in light of Lawrence, the 
 
sions of particular categories of speech, such as incitement and true threats, 
from First Amendment protection. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
44748 (1969) (incitement to imminent lawless action); Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (true threats); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (some defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 57172 (1942) (fighting words). The glaring exception is the 
obscenity doctrine. See infra notes 28083 and accompanying text (contending 
that acceptance of the harm principle as a barometer of justifiable speech re-
strictions requires rejection of the Supreme Courts present basis for permit-
ting obscenity regulations). Concerns about harm also explain Supreme Court 
decisions that uphold speech restrictions under a balancing analysis. See, e.g., 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 65761 (1990) (uphold-
ing a states restriction on corporate political expenditures under strict scru-
tiny because the state had a compelling interest in preventing a danger of 
real or apparent corruption). 
 234. See supra notes 1420 and accompanying text. This position compels, 
among other things, full protection for political statements that insult or de-
ride specified groups of people. An aspiration of the public rights theory is that 
its affirmative First Amendment commitment to robust public debate would 
increase real opportunities to answer such hateful expression, which often 
targets people and groups for whom a merely formal right to respond with 
more speech rings hollow. Cf. Magarian, Public Rights, supra note 2, at 
198385 (describing the public rights theorys substantive conception of ex-
pressive freedom). 
 235. See supra notes 17883 and accompanying text (describing present 
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Due Process Clause should protect behavior that advances per-
sonal autonomy, whether or not the behavior has the descrip-
tive characteristics of speech.236 As a practical matter, how-
ever, expression is a category of behavior especially likely to 
serve and reflect a persons autonomy and individuality. More-
over, in classic substantive due process terms, the Free Speech 
Clause generates penumbras237 or implications238 that make 
expression that the First Amendment does not protect an espe-
cially logical object of substantive due process protection. 
Applying Lawrence to nonpolitical speech claims would 
avoid the pitfalls of previous attempts in the public rights tra-
dition to differentiate constitutional protections of political and 
nonpolitical speech.239 Unlike Meiklejohns procedural due 
process salve,240 substantive due process would provide mean-
ingful protection to speech that advances personal autonomy, 
reflecting the insight that nonpolitical speech, to the extent it 
serves the interest of personal autonomy, deserves a substan-
tially greater constitutional shield than ordinary behavior. 
Unlike Sunsteins two-tiered First Amendment,241 the substan-
 
substantive due process protections for various nonexpressive activities). 
 236. By making nonpolitical speech claims turn on the importance of the 
speech in question for personal autonomy, this due process approach would 
circumvent the speech-action distinction that Robert Bork emphasized to un-
dermine the logic of protecting nonpolitical speech under the First Amend-
ment. See Bork, supra note 25, at 25 (contending that the First Amendment 
cannot protect merely self-gratifying speech because no principle permits a 
distinction between self-gratifying speech and self-gratifying action). Of 
course, shifting nonpolitical speech protection to the Due Process Clause 
would also require judges to elaborate and implement legal values, an ap-
proach that could hardly have less affinity with Borks jurisprudence. See id. 
at 28 (arguing that commitment to neutral principles requires leaving dis-
putes about nonpolitical speech to the enlightenment of society and its elected 
representatives). 
 237. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting that 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance). 
 238. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (presenting the 
issue as whether the law infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the enactment violates basic values implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937))). 
 239. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 240. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 7980 (proposing protection for 
nonpolitical speech under procedural due process principles). 
 241. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 263315 (advancing a proposal to ac-
cord nonpolitical speech a lower level of First Amendment protection than po-
litical speech would receive). 
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tive due process approach would, thanks to Lawrence, enjoy a 
doctrinally coherent foundation and embody a principled basis 
for extending strong constitutional protection to important in-
stances of nonpolitical expression. Unlike both previous pro-
posals, the substantive due process solution would advance the 
positive value of the public rights theorymaximizing protec-
tion for political speechwhile also effectuating the core in-
sight of the private rights theory: that personal autonomy oc-
cupies a central place in our conception of constitutional rights. 
Indeed, by concentrating constitutional analysis of nonpoli-
tical speech claims on the personal autonomy values at stake, 
this substantive due process approach would far more accu-
rately reflect the principal reason for protecting nonpolitical 
speech than present First Amendment doctrine does. Under my 
proposal, the Constitution should not protect speech, nonpoliti-
cal or political, merely because it is formally speech, but 
rather because it advances either personal autonomy or politi-
cal discourse. Focusing on the reason that nonpolitical speech 
deserves strong constitutional protection would give the Court 
a firm basis for keeping that protection robust. Just as the pub-
lic rights theory of expressive freedom requires emphasis on 
the bottom line of healthy political discourse, application of the 
Lawrence doctrine to nonpolitical speech would require empha-
sis on the bottom line of protecting personal autonomy. 
Some may object to extending substantive due process doc-
trine to encompass nonpolitical speech due to the queasiness 
that reflexively greets any proposal to extend substantive due 
process. On this view, courts should avoid invoking substantive 
due process because the Due Process Clause provides no clear 
standards for judicial decision and thus invites judicial activ-
ism.242 This argument rests on questionable premisesthat 
 
 242. The Court articulated this view in Collins v. City of Harker Heights: 
  As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to ex-
pand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for 
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and 
open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exer-
cise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in 
this field. 
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citation omitted). Critics might also point out that 
the Supreme Court has barred substantive due process claims where a specific 
constitutional guarantee is available to challenge the conduct at issue. See 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 39495 (1989) (holding that excessive-force 
claims against police officers must be brought under the Fourth Amendment 
because it provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection). 
Lower courts have invoked Graham to bar substantive due process claims be-
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any constitutional text provides more than a broad outline for a 
complex and sophisticated doctrine of rights, that personal 
freedom should be a stingy exception to the rule of government 
power, and that judicial innovation contradicts the constitu-
tional design. Even if one accepts its premises, however, the ar-
gument cannot withstand scrutiny. First, the Lawrence per-
sonal autonomy principle clarifies substantive due process 
doctrine by providing a conceptually specific value capable of 
channeling judicial discretion. Second, present First Amend-
ment doctrine already requires judges to make all manner of 
subjective, discretionary decisions in balancing nonpolitical (as 
well as political) expressive interests against government regu-
latory interests.243 Framing nonpolitical speech claims in per-
sonal autonomy terms, far from increasing judicial subjectivity, 
would anchor free speech jurisprudence by injecting the defin-
ing concept of personal autonomy into the balancing of the 
speakers and the governments interests. 
III.  APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TO 
NONPOLITICAL SPEECH 
Shifting constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech 
from the First Amendment to the Due Process Clause would 
work a substantial change in the law. On the First Amendment 
side of the fence, political speech would enjoy stronger protec-
tion than it currently does, because no other categories of 
speech would complicate the public rights theorys elevation of 
political speech to the highest constitutional priority.244 This 
section briefly explores the practical implications of my pro-
 
cause the plaintiffs could have sued under the First Amendment. See Hufford 
v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (barring a firefighters claim 
that his department fired him for reporting coworkers misconduct); cf. Thad-
deus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 38788 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (discussing 
the direction from Graham that substantive due process is an inappropriate 
basis for claims rooted in an enumerated constitutional right and proceeding 
to analyze the plaintiffs retaliation claims under a First Amendment frame-
work). Peter Rubin has argued persuasively that only a narrow reading of 
Graham, limited to using specific rights guarantees to define the ceilings of 
substantive due process claims, comports with established rights jurispru-
dence. See Rubin, supra note 162, at 865. In any event, my proposal would ob-
viate the Graham problem for nonpolitical speech claims because those claims 
would no longer properly arise under the First Amendment. 
 243. See supra notes 10511 and accompanying text (discussing the neces-
sity of judicial line drawing under present First Amendment doctrine). 
 244. See supra notes 10001 and accompanying text (describing the bene-
fits for political speech of a judicial shift to the public rights theory). 
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posed shift for several controversies involving nonpolitical 
speech. Courts would allow government to regulate speech that 
is not substantially related to personal autonomy based on 
credible showings of potential harm. Speech integral to per-
sonal autonomy, however, would receive protection comparable 
to, and in some cases stronger than, the protection that the 
First Amendment presently provides. 
One preliminary problem is determining whose personal 
autonomy should matter in the substantive due process speech 
balance. The subjects of the personal autonomy claim in Law-
rence were direct participants in the legally proscribed behav-
ior. Courts would face greater challenges in determining the lo-
cus of due process claims involving speech. First Amendment 
theorists frequently have acknowledged the parallel autonomy 
interests of speakers and people who receive information.245 
Given the plurality of autonomy interests in expression, courts 
that apply the Due Process Clause to nonpolitical speech claims 
could properly consider the interests of receivers as well as 
speakers, according due process protection both to speech that 
advances the speakers autonomy interest and to speech that 
advances the autonomy interests of individual listeners. Not-
withstanding the vagaries of standing doctrine,246 the auton-
omy interests of receivers would provide grounds for institu-
tional speakers to raise free speech claims under the Due 
Process Clause in appropriate circumstances. 
The discussion that follows requires two additional cave-
ats. First, the Lawrence Court left unclear its precise standard 
of review and the relationship of its analysis to doctrinal ele-
ments of previous substantive due process cases.247 Considering 
 
 245. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 104, at 62021 (arguing that expressive 
freedom serves the value of individual self-realization both by protecting 
speech and by protecting the right to receive information). 
 246. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (holding that a 
claim that the rights of a third party have been violated is insufficient to es-
tablish standing). An approach to constitutional speech protection that em-
phasized the consequences of protecting or regulating expression would re-
quire reevaluation of the Courts present standing doctrine. See Magarian, 
Public Rights, supra note 2, at 198889 & n.211. 
 247. The indeterminate standard of review may simply reflect tiered scru-
tinys limited analytic value. See Tribe, supra note 124, at 191617 (arguing 
that the Lawrence Court, despite avoiding the ordinary rhetorical formula-
tions of tiered scrutiny, obviously subjected the Texas sodomy prohibition to a 
rigorous standard of review). Alternatively, the Lawrence Court may have 
viewed the prior substantive due process decisions emphasis on identifying 
fundamental rights as a rhetorical trap inclined to limit the doctrines pro-
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how free speech controversies would play out under a Law-
rence-derived regime therefore involves a necessary element of 
conjecture. Second, my proposal would not completely divide 
speech claims between First Amendment and substantive due 
process cases. Claimants who challenged government interfer-
ence with their putatively nonpolitical expression would, under 
my proposal, retain the opportunity to contend that their bur-
dened expression had sufficient political character to warrant 
First Amendment protection. Moreover, the First Amendment 
could support claims that restrictions on particular nonpolitical 
expression would have chilling effects on political speech. Such 
contentions would figure prominently in the adjudication of 
many free speech cases, but my discussion presumes scenarios 
in which they would not be available in order to focus on how 
the Due Process Clause would work distinctly to protect speech. 
The discussion briefly examines my proposals potential ef-
fects on three important categories of speech that frequently 
lack political salience: artistic and cultural expression, pornog-
raphy, and commercial advertising. 
A. ARTISTIC AND CULTURAL EXPRESSION 
The imperative to protect nonpolitical artistic and cultural 
expression against censorship has traditionally formed the 
most intuitive basis for criticizing proposals to extend First 
Amendment protection only to political speech.248 Advocates of 
the private rights theory have made a powerful case for consti-
tutional protection of artistic speech based on its deeply per-
sonal importance to the artist.249 Although public rights theo-
rists have finessed the issue by reference to arts often indirect 
political messages, maintaining the singular constitutional 
status of political speech requires treating a significant portion 
of artistic expression as nonpolitical.250 Under present First 
Amendment doctrine, courts emphasize the value of artistic 
and cultural expression for personal autonomy and, in terms 
 
tective scope. See Hunter, supra note 170, at 1119 (arguing that the Courts 
conservative wing has fought to enshrine the category of fundamental rights 
as a containment device). 
 248. See supra notes 13040 and accompanying text (describing the con-
sensus in favor of constitutional protection for nonpolitical speech). 
 249. A very effective recent example is Anne S. Kurzweg, Live Art and the 
Audience: Toward a Speaker-Focused Freedom of Expression, 34 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 437, 43940 (1999). 
 250. See supra notes 14345 and accompanying text. 
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redolent of Lawrence, extend constitutional protection on that 
basis. In the words of one recent opinion: The Constitution ex-
ists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including es-
thetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be 
formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says is 
that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the 
Government to decree . . . .251 
Courts, however, have failed to develop a fully coherent 
justification for protecting artistic and cultural expression un-
der the First Amendment,252 a deficit that has sometimes led to 
unsatisfactory constitutional protection for important speech. 
Artistic and cultural expression is especially vulnerable when it 
explores themes of sexuality, thereby blurring some officials 
and courts perception of the boundary between art and pornog-
raphy.253 Some decisions have blithely tolerated morally based 
regulation of art, particularly in the familiar circumstance 
where government patronage underwrites censorship. In Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Supreme Court 
upheld a statutory requirement that federal decisions to fund 
art tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and 
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American pub-
lic.254 Although the Court tried to downplay the decency and 
respect requirement as merely advisory,255 it substantively de-
fended the requirement as an appropriate element of the dis-
cretion necessarily exercised in a competitive funding proc-
ess.256 Similarly, in Hopper v. City of Pasco,257 the Ninth Circuit 
recognized the prerogative of municipalities to exclude contro-
versial art from public forums. In sustaining a First Amend-
ment challenge by artists whose work the city had refused to 
 
 251. United States v. Playboy Entmt Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000); 
see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002) (Art and lit-
erature express the vital interest we all have in the formative years we our-
selves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so pro-
found, and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment 
are still in reach.). 
 252. See Kurzweg, supra note 249, at 438 (noting the absence of coherent 
theory and criticizing the Supreme Courts medium-specific approach to First 
Amendment protection of art). 
 253. For a discussion of pornography regulation, see infra Part III.B. 
 254. 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting  20 U.S.C. 
§ 954(d)(1) (2000)). 
 255. Id. at 581. 
 256. Id. at 58586 (justifying the decency requirement as an appropriate 
component of discretionary allocation of limited funds). 
 257. 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 
MAGARIAN_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:55:40 AM 
2005] DUE PROCESS AS PROTECTION FOR SPEECH 303 
 
display, the court concluded only that the city had failed to de-
fine and enforce its prohibition on controversial art, not that 
such a prohibition violated the Constitution.258 
More prevalent than manifest judicial allowance for moral 
censorship of artistic and cultural expression has been preemp-
tive or reactive self-censorship by sponsoring institutions. The 
Smithsonian Institution endured a barrage of such actions dur-
ing the 1990s. First, objections by western senators to the ex-
planatory texts of an exhibit, The West as America, which 
forthrightly dealt with such issues as the ideological nature of 
the United States western expansion and white settlers mas-
sacre of Native Americans, led the National Museum of Ameri-
can Art to sanitize the offending texts.259 Just weeks later, the 
Smithsonians director temporarily removed a work by artist 
Sol LeWitt from a tribute to photographic pioneer Eadweard 
Muybridge because she deemed the work, a box with apertures 
through which viewers observed an approaching nude female, 
degrading to women.260 In 1996 the National Air and Space 
Museum cancelled a long-planned exhibit commemorating the 
Enola Gays atomic bombings of Japan because of controversy 
about the exhibits questioning the justifications for the bomb-
ings.261 Nongovernmental beneficiaries of government cultural 
subsidies face similar pressures. In recent years, fear of contro-
versy within the National Endowment for the Arts has re-
sulted in a kind of self-censorship among arts groups, officials 
of several organizations say, in which applicants try to second-
guess what the endowment will approve.262 
Although public patronage looms large in any discussion of 
artistic and cultural censorship, governments also use their po-
lice powers to suppress provocative or offensive art. Cities shut 
down exhibitions due to complaints about offensive content.263 
 
 258. See id. at 1078. 
 259. See Michael Kimmelman, Old West, New Twist at the Smithsonian, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 2, at 1. 
 260. See Michael Kimmelman, Peering into Peepholes and Finding Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991, § 2, at 1. 
 261. See Paul Goldberger, Historical Shows on Trial: Who Judges?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, § 2, at 1. 
 262. Robin Pogrebin, A New Chief Steps in at a Changed National Endow-
ment for the Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at A19. 
 263. See, e.g., Joe Lewis, Watts Towers Show Nixed, ART AM., Dec. 2001, at 
25 (describing Los Angeles officials decision to shut down an exhibit that in-
cluded images of same-sex dancing partners and renderings of police offi-
cers and local gang members in what many deemed to be homoerotic poses). 
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The FCC fines performers for expressing controversial or ar-
guably immoral viewpoints over broadcast media.264 States 
prosecute artists or museums for fine-art photography that in-
corporates images of unclothed children.265 Even worse, fear of 
government action, as in the context of subsidies, often leads 
artistic and cultural institutions to engage in self-censorship.266 
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, numerous 
institutions suppressed expression that might have appeared 
offensive or provocative in light of the attacks.267 As in the con-
troversies about government funding, sexual content has pro-
vided the most consistent source of concern. In one recent ex-
ample, the Denver Civic Theatre pulled down a painting 
displayed in conjunction with a performance because the paint-
ing depicted two men kissing.268 On a broader scale, the film, 
television, music, video game, and comic book industries, under 
heavy pressure from the federal government, have all imposed 
highly visible rating systems on creators.269 All these episodes 
provide cause to fear that our legal system cannot or will not 
protect challenging, autonomous artistic or cultural expression 
from majoritarian censorship. 
 
 
 264. See, e.g., Jones v. FCC, 02 CIV. 693 (DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16396, at *89 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2002) (denying on jurisdictional grounds a 
poets complaint against the FCC for branding one of her works indecent). 
 265. See, e.g., Chuck Philips, A War on Many Fronts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 
1990, at F1 (discussing the federal investigation of photographer Jock Sturges 
and the indictment of the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center and its direc-
tor). 
 266. Investigations and harassment by government agencies certainly help 
explain private art institutions resort to self-censorship as an alternative to 
adverse government action. See Axtman, supra note 52 (describing an aggres-
sive federal investigation of a politically charged art exhibit). 
 267. See Magarian, Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 12324 (describing 
instances of self-censorship by privately owned artistic and cultural institu-
tions following the 2001 terrorist attacks). Much of the art that raised con-
cerns after September 11 has undeniable political content, which means it 
would receive First Amendment protection under this Articles approach to 
expressive freedom. 
 268. See Penny Parker, Kiss-Off of Gallerys Artwork a Low for Puppetry 
Promoters, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, at 7A. 
 269. See, e.g., Rating Entertainment Ratings: How Well are They Working 
for Parents and What Can be Done to Improve Them?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 13657 (2002) (statement of 
Joanne Cantor, Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison), available at 
http://www.joannecantor.com/senatrat_tst.htm (describing present voluntary 
entertainment ratings and advocating government action to strengthen and 
standardize ratings). 
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Unless we accept the unsavory premise that public patron-
age carries with it some special government prerogative to im-
pose orthodoxy of viewpoint,270 considerations of decency and 
controversy should be out of bounds when the government de-
cides whether and how to sponsor artistic and cultural expres-
sion.271 Principles of expressive freedom even more obviously 
should preclude government censorship of private artistic and 
cultural speech. In both contexts, the Constitution should pro-
vide assurances sufficient to deter preemptive self-censorship. 
The holes in present First Amendment doctrines protection of 
nonpolitical artistic and cultural expression derive from courts 
failures to recognize the full constitutional significance of per-
sonal autonomy and to reject morally based assaults on 
autonomous expression. The autonomy and harm principles ar-
ticulated in Lawrence make substantive due process a more co-
gent and effective source of constitutional protection for nonpo-
litical artistic expression than the First Amendment has been. 
Under the reasoning of Lawrence, arts importance for further-
ing personal autonomy would elevate censorship of art to the 
 
 270. See Natl Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 599 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (I regard the distinction between 
abridging speech and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of 
which the First Amendment is inapplicable.). Among many reasons to reject 
this doctrine, a few can be summarized briefly: the government should never 
develop a habit of drawing moral distinctions among citizens competing ideas; 
government funding has sufficient importance to make it a practical necessity 
for many artists; and discretionary government rejection of a particular moral 
perspective strongly implies government disapproval of that perspective, rais-
ing the danger of a chilling effect on other speech. The public rights theory 
may also compel a strong rule of government nondiscrimination in subsidizing 
expression as a protective condition on the theorys heightened tolerance for 
government regulation to expand expressive freedom. See Sunstein, supra 
note 15, at 29799 (advocating such a rule). 
 271. A conceivable objection to my contention that the Due Process Clause 
would toughen the Courts protection of art in the particular context of gov-
ernment sponsorship is that the Court, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services, held that the Due Process Clause does not place 
affirmative obligations on the government. 489 U.S. 189, 19597 (1989). That 
objection lacks force. When the government establishes a public grant program 
and then chooses one applicant over another on moral grounds, it is exercising 
its discretion within a course of action to which it has already committed. That 
commitment distinguishes the arts-funding scenario from the DeShaney ma-
joritys account of the case before it, where the state agency had taken no ac-
tions that would have led it to remove a reportedly abused child from his fa-
thers custody. See id. at 19293 (describing the states actions in the case). 
Moreover, the Court decided DeShaney during a period when it generally dis-
dained substantive due process doctrine, and Lawrence represents a clear 
break from that period. 
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height of substantive due process concern.272 Likewise, the 
Lawrence Courts firm rejection of moral grounds for restricting 
personal autonomy should place nearly all artistic and cultural 
censorship out of bounds.273 Justifying a restriction on artistic 
or cultural expression would require a persuasive showing that 
the expression caused concrete harm.274 Ideological biases and 
decency canards would not suffice. 
B. PORNOGRAPHY 
The Supreme Court purports to accord full First Amend-
ment protection to nonobscene sexually explicit speech.275 The 
Court, however, has shown unusual willingness to credit the 
governments grounds for regulating pornography. For exam-
ple, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., which upheld certain state 
restrictions on nude dancing, the Court only grudgingly admit-
ted that such performance was expressive conduct at all276 and 
then subordinated the respondents expressive interests to an 
amorphous substantial government interest in protecting or-
der and morality.277 Similarly, the Court has upheld municipal 
zoning ordinances that restrict the locations of adult enter-
tainment businesses, minimizing the expressive interests at is-
sue while validating government prerogatives to combat pos-
ited but undocumented secondary effects of such busi-
nesses.278 The Court has even placed a subset of sexually ex-
 
 272. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Lawrence decisions commitment 
to personal autonomy as the basis for substantive due process doctrine). 
 273. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Lawrence decisions rejection of 
purely moral grounds for government regulation of activity with value for per-
sonal autonomy). 
 274. One submission that might satisfy this standard would be a demon-
strated public health risk from an artistic performance that exposed an audi-
ence to contaminated blood. See Kurzweg, supra note 249, at 483. 
 275. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 87475 (1997) (reiterating the 
doctrine that, for adults, nonobscene sexually explicit speech receives constitu-
tional protection). 
 276. See 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that exotic dancing is expres-
sive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we 
view it as only marginally so). 
 277. Id. at 569. 
 278. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) 
(upholding a Renton, Washington, ordinance that mandated distances be-
tween adult movie theatres and residential neighborhoods, churches, parks, 
and schools); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63, 73 (1976) (up-
holding Detroit ordinances that prohibited concentrations of adult-oriented 
businesses). 
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plicit speech, labeled obscenity, entirely outside the First 
Amendments protection.279 These departures from First 
Amendment doctrine resist principled explanation and 
threaten to undermine the precepts of expressive freedom. 
Moving nonpolitical speech protection from the First 
Amendment to the Due Process Clause would sharpen constitu-
tional analysis of pornography regulation. First, pornographic 
materials entitlement to constitutional protection, rather than 
turning on the materials technically expressive character, 
would depend largely on the materials contribution to the per-
sonal autonomy of its creators and/or consumers. Pornography 
producers could not simply run to court, crying about lost prof-
its. On the other hand, courts could not reflexively dismiss por-
nographic materials claims to constitutional protection based 
on abstractions about whether the material was speech; in-
stead, they would need to examine the materials value for ad-
vancing personal autonomy. Second, courts would need to dis-
tinguish precisely between moral and harm-based justifications 
for restrictions on pornography, allowing only the latter to vin-
dicate challenged regulations. Regulators would have the op-
portunity to prove that pornographic material had caused con-
crete social harms. They could not, however, justify state 
pornography regulations simply by asserting the existence of 
unspecified harms, let alone by claiming an interest in uphold-
ing some notion of public morality. 
A shift from First Amendment to substantive due process 
protection for pornography probably would produce mixed deci-
sional results. On one hand, constitutional protection for sexu-
ally explicit speech would increase dramatically because, in 
light of Lawrence, the Supreme Courts obscenity doctrine is 
untenable. The Courts decision in Miller v. California permit-
ted criminal penalties for obscene speech, defined to encom-
pass 
works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be 
specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authori-
tatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works 
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken 
as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.280 
 
 
 279. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 280. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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First Amendment doctrine never should have tolerated 
such a blatant capitulation to majoritarian biases, but it has. 
The Miller Courts categorical exemption from expressive free-
dom, however, runs afoul of both aspects of Lawrence that 
would animate substantive due process protection for nonpoliti-
cal speech. First, the Miller test takes no account of the auton-
omy value of obscene material. The Miller safe harbor for seri-
ous artistic value provides some basis for considering 
autonomy arguments, but it speaks in very general terms, leav-
ing the autonomy interests of creators and receivers of ob-
scene material invisible. Lawrence compels correction of that 
defect in Miller, not least because Lawrence itself found auton-
omy value in what some consider deviant sexual behavior281
exactly the sort of behavior whose mere portrayal Miller allows 
states to criminalize. Second, Miller carved out an exception to 
First Amendment protection based entirely on states putative 
interests in moral regulation, defining the prurient interest 
prong of the obscenity test by reference to the perspective of 
the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards.282 The Court made no effort to ground the exception in 
concrete harm to third parties. Under substantive due process 
as elaborated in Lawrence, the species of purely moral regula-
tion enabled by Miller cannot survive.283 
 
 281. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (explaining that 
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act . . . 
touch[] upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior). 
 282. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. This factor distinguishes the Courts treatment 
of obscenity from its analysis of other categories of speech as to which it has 
denied or limited First Amendment protection, all of which threaten some de-
gree of harm to third parties. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 44748 
(1969) (incitement to imminent lawless action); Watts v. United States, 394 
U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (true threats); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
268 (1964) (some defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
57172 (1942) (fighting words). 
 283.  One federal judge recently held an obscenity prosecution unconstitu-
tional on the theory that Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), established a 
fundamental right to possess obscene material, which Lawrence must shield 
from morally based regulation. See United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 
F. Supp. 2d 578, 58687 (W.D. Pa. 2005). Another district judge has rejected 
that argument. See United States v. Gartman, Criminal No. 3:04-CR-170-H, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1501, at *56 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) (denying a mo-
tion for reconsideration). Present First Amendment doctrine cannot coherently 
support the reasoning of Extreme Associates, because that doctrine has long 
and consistently accommodated the morally grounded Miller test despite 
Stanley and despite the otherwise prominent prohibition on viewpoint-based 
discrimination. Sharpening free speech jurisprudence by applying substantive 
due process categorically to nonpolitical speech, as this Article proposes, would 
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On the other hand, a substantive due process analysis 
would decrease constitutional protection for pornography that 
had limited value for the autonomy of artists or consumers, to 
the extent regulators could show that the material likely would 
harm third parties. These were precisely the contentions ad-
vanced on behalf of the MacKinnon-Dworkin antipornography 
ordinance struck down in American Booksellers Assn v. Hud-
nut.284 Because institutional profits do not advance personal 
autonomy in the sense of Lawrence, the only viable autonomy 
claims for pornography would lie with creatorsa group that 
could include writers, photographers, and directors as well as 
models and performersand consumers. In many cases, crea-
tors might face difficulty trying to parlay the creative content of 
commercial pornography into viable autonomy claims; more-
over, the pornography industrys exploitation of models and 
performers would likely yield, from their standpoint, negative 
autonomy values in many cases.285 Pornography consumers po-
tentially could raise salient claims that various pornographic 
materials made significant contributions to their sexual auton-
omy. On the other hand, defenders of the MacKinnon-Dworkin 
ordinance in Hudnut maintained that pornography, far from 
advancing its consumers autonomy, undermined some con-
sumers will, increasing their propensities toward misogyny 
and sexual violence.286 Thus, the posited behavioral conse-
quences of pornography provided the most powerful justifica-
tion for the ordinance, which its defenders characterized as 
protecting women from rape and other forms of gendered vio-
lence and exploitation that shatter their autonomy. 
In his Hudnut opinion, Judge Easterbrook offered no sug-
gestion that any persons autonomy was relevant to evaluating 
the ordinance; instead, he stressed the importance of prevent-
ing government from interfering with the descriptive category 
of speech.287 Likewise, Judge Easterbrook turned the harm 
 
repair this long-standing anomaly more effectively than either trying to patch 
flawed First Amendment doctrine piecemeal with bits of Lawrence or imagin-
ing that Lawrence completely subsumed the First Amendment within the Due 
Process Clause. 
 284. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (mem.). 
 285. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIS-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 12733 (1987) (arguing that the pornography in-
dustry materially exploits and demeans women who work in it). 
 286. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (accepting the governments premise that 
[d]epictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination). 
 287. See id. at 32728. 
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arguments advanced by the ordinances defenders against 
them, concluding that any rape or harassment that resulted 
from pornography demonstrated pornographys rhetorical effec-
tiveness.288 These elements of Judge Easterbrooks decision, 
while controversial even on conventional First Amendment 
terms, reflect the reality that the ordinance faced a strong First 
Amendment challenge simply because it restricted speech. A 
substantive due process analysis would proceed from more pre-
cise premises: the centrality of autonomy for nonpolitical 
speech protection and the requirement of harm to justify regu-
lation. Had the ordinances defenders succeeded in undermin-
ing autonomy arguments made on behalf of pornography and in 
linking pornography to concrete harms, they might well have 
defeated a due process challenge.289 
C. CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The Supreme Court over the past three decades has devel-
oped an increasingly expansive doctrine of First Amendment 
protection for corporate speech. The Court generally treats cor-
porations like individuals in First Amendment analysis, ex-
tending full protection to most types of corporate speech.290 The 
Court has distinguished from fully protected expression the 
 
 288. See id. at 329 (asserting that any harm caused by pornography sim-
ply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech). 
 289. I offer no view about the likelihood of making either showing, and my 
hesitation about predicting the result in the due process scenario reflects a 
doctrinal problem that adopting my proposal would require the Court to re-
solve. Whatever its other constitutional defects, the version of the MacKinnon-
Dworkin ordinance struck down in Hudnut was drafted in a manner that al-
most certainly rendered it overbroad, though the district court declined to 
reach the issue. See Am. Booksellers Assn v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 
133940 (S.D. Ind. 1984). The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine repre-
sents a singular exception to standing doctrine developed in the context of the 
present, inclusive First Amendment to protect against government action that 
chills expression. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (de-
scribing First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an exception to ordinary 
standing rules). The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine should apply in 
substantive due process cases where challenged burdens on nonpolitical 
speech threaten to cross into the First Amendments domain by chilling politi-
cal expression. 
 290. See First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (striking 
down a state restriction on corporate expenditures to influence referendum 
proposals); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) 
(distinguishing the lesser First Amendment protection accorded commercial 
advertising from the full protection accorded the corporations direct com-
ments on public issues). 
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category of commercial speech, a term of art that generally 
encompasses commercial advertising.291 Even that subset of 
corporate speech, however, gets substantial First Amendment 
protection under a species of intermediate heightened scru-
tiny.292 Although the Courts protection for commercial speech 
deviates from its prior deference to government regulation of 
advertising,293 several Justices have advocated further dimin-
ishing the distinction between commercial speech and fully pro-
tected speech.294 In contrast to my proposals beneficial implica-
tions for artistic and cultural expression295 and ambiguous 
implications for pornography,296 shifting protection for nonpoli-
tical speech from the First Amendment to the Due Process 
Clause would substantially diminish constitutional protection 
for commercial speech and for corporate speech generally. 
The Supreme Court generally grants substantive due proc-
ess protection only to natural persons. That limitation marks 
one of the strongest distinctions between the contemporary 
substantive due process doctrine that emerged from Griswold 
v. Connecticut297 and the discredited doctrine of Lochner v. New 
York.298 The Lawrence Courts crystallization of personal 
 
 291. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (defining the special First Amendment category of 
commercial speech as connoting speech that does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 292. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn, 447 U.S. 
557, 564 (1980) (If [commercial speech] is neither misleading nor related to 
unlawful activity . . . [t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be 
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory tech-
nique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression 
must be designed carefully to achieve the States goal.). 
 293. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that 
constitutional speech protection did not extend to commercial advertising). 
 294. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) 
(plurality opinion) (advocating more searching First Amendment review of 
commercial speech regulations that serve end[s] unrelated to consumer pro-
tection); id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (rejecting the Central Hudson balancing test for commercial speech 
at least when, as here, the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved 
through keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark) (footnote omit-
ted). 
 295. See supra Part III.A. 
 296. See supra Part III.B. 
 297. 381 U.S. 479, 48586 (1965) (striking down a state ban on dispensing 
contraceptives as a violation of the fundamental constitutional right to pri-
vacy). 
 298. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a state regulation of employees 
hours as a violation of the substantive due process right to contract). 
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autonomy as the basis for substantive due process protection 
strengthens the logic of limiting due process protection to indi-
viduals, because only individuals can experience personal 
autonomy. The limitation of substantive due process protection 
to natural persons also distinguishes due process doctrine from 
the Supreme Courts protection of commercial speech under the 
First Amendment. That protection reflects the Courts general 
tendency to extend constitutional rights guarantees to corpo-
rate persons without regard to any underlying interest of dis-
crete individuals.299 Thus, one important consequence of shift-
ing protection for nonpolitical speech from the First 
Amendment to the Due Process Clause would be that only 
natural persons interests could form the basis for nonpolitical 
free speech claims. Those interests might be manifest in certain 
institutions, such as theater companies or publications edito-
rial boards, but a claim could prevail only if suppression of the 
speech at issue undermined some natural persons or persons 
personal autonomy.300 This limitation would render corporate 
free speech claims presumptively untenable. 
The logic of allowing only natural persons to raise nonpoli-
tical speech claims under the Due Process Clause, and the re-
sulting dearth of constitutional protection for corporate speech, 
underscores the Lawrence doctrines affinity with previous 
autonomy-based theories of expressive freedom. Professor 
Baker, perhaps the most sophisticated proponent of an auton-
omy-based approach to the First Amendment, has argued that 
an autonomy focus should preclude protection for corporate 
speech.301 Baker conceptualizes expressive freedom as a shield 
for individual freedom and choice, and he rejects constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech, broadly defined to en-
compass corporate speech generally, because commercial 
speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect the 
 
 299. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 39495 
(1886) (extending the equal protection doctrine to corporations). 
 300. For a related contention that only natural persons autonomy interests 
should ground constitutional rights claims and insulate behavior from consti-
tutional responsibility through the public-private distinction, see Magarian, 
Wartime Debate, supra note 28, at 14650. 
 301. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the 
Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing that First Amendment 
theory requires that commercial speech be denied First Amendment protec-
tion). But see Redish, supra note 104, at 63035 (arguing that commercial 
speech, because of its important contributions to self-realization, should en-
joy First Amendment protection). 
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world in a way which can be expected to represent anyones pri-
vate or personal wishes.302 The present doctrine of forceful 
First Amendment protection for commercial speech has devel-
oped in spite of the Supreme Courts substantial embrace of the 
autonomy-based private rights theory.303 Eliminating that 
anomaly would exemplify the increased clarity a substantive 
due process approach would bring to nonpolitical speech con-
troversies. 
In contrast to Bakers single-minded emphasis on the 
speakers autonomy,304 the conception of personal autonomy 
this Article has derived from Lawrence also encompasses the 
autonomy interests of people who receive information.305 Under 
conventional First Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court 
has maintained that consumers gain valuable insights, and 
thus increase their ability to make autonomous decisions in the 
economic marketplace, through exposure to commercial infor-
mation.306 Stripping away the rhetorical bunting of the First 
Amendment, however, would facilitate a fresh critique of re-
ceiver-focused arguments for protecting corporate and commer-
cial speech. First, the due process setting would provide space 
that the First Amendment precludes for considering counter-
vailing ways in which commercial speech diminishes personal 
autonomy by manipulating its audience. Just as pornography 
arguably can erode some of its consumers inhibitions against 
rape and sexual assault,307 commercial advertising arguably 
can erode its receivers resistance to unfulfilling or even harm-
ful consumption.308 Second, even to the extent commercial 
 
 302. Baker, supra note 301, at 3. Baker extends his limitation on First 
Amendment protection to exclude corporate speech generally, including corpo-
rate political speech, because profit incentives rather than individual value 
choices motivate corporate speech. See id. at 1418. 
 303. See supra notes 213 and accompanying text. 
 304. See Baker, supra note 301, at 8 (arguing that the First Amendment 
does not give the listener any right other than to have the government not 
interfere with a willing speakers liberty). 
 305. See supra notes 24546 and accompanying text. 
 306. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (positing that [commercial] information is not 
in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they 
are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them). 
 307. See supra notes 28089 and accompanying text. 
 308. The economic enterprise does not passively accept individual values 
as given. In order to increase profits, the enterprise attempts to create and 
manipulate values. It does this by stimulating particular desires. Baker, su-
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speech increases consumers autonomy, that effect falls short of 
the autonomy benefits enjoyed by receivers of art and even 
some pornography. Those forms of nonpolitical expression fre-
quently connect with their audiences at deep levels of personal 
intimacy. In contrast, the principal argument for protecting 
commercial speechthat it assists consumers in making eco-
nomic decisionsspeaks to the less integral idea of economic 
autonomy. Corporations advertisements surely facilitate con-
sumer purchasing choices, but so do their manufacturing deci-
sions, financial strategies, and distribution practices, all of 
which the Courts disavowal of Lochner long ago made clear the 
government may regulate without regard to due process con-
cerns. 
In addition, the Due Process Clause likely would protect 
commercial speech less forcefully than the First Amendment 
does because rationales offered for regulating commercial 
speech, as opposed to those offered for regulating art and por-
nography, tend to appeal much more to practicality than to mo-
rality.309 States tend to regulate commercial advertising be-
cause of concerns about consumer protection310 or public 
health.311 Present First Amendment doctrine gives courts a ba-
sis for dismissing even those interests as insufficient to justify 
 
pra note 301, at 19. The Supreme Court has shown inconsistency in evaluating 
consumer manipulation arguments against protection of commercial advertis-
ing. Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 34044 
(1986) (upholding a regulation of gambling advertising based on an interest in 
not encouraging gambling), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 
484, 504, 516 (1996) (striking down a regulation of liquor advertising despite 
the states interest in not encouraging alcohol abuse). 
 309. See supra notes 25258, 28083 and accompanying text (discussing 
the moral bases of efforts to regulate art and pornography). 
 310. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977) (noting that the 
state defended its ban on attorney advertising on the ground that advertising 
would lead attorneys to provide clients with services not tailored to clients 
particular needs). 
 311. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 767 (noting that the 
state defended its drug price advertising ban on the ground that such advertis-
ing will place in jeopardy the pharmacists expertise and, with it, the cus-
tomers health). Some commercial speech regulations arguably serve purely 
moral purposes. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 341 (upholding 
a restriction on casino gambling advertising as advancing a substantial gov-
ernment interest in reduction of demand for casino gambling by the residents 
of Puerto Rico). Assuming a state could not show that such a regulation pre-
vented some cognizable injury within the meaning of the Lawrence harm prin-
ciple, and assuming the regulated advertisement advanced personal autonomy 
in some meaningful sense, a substantive due process approach to protecting 
noncommercial speech would foreclose the regulation. 
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regulations.312 In contrast, the Due Process Clause after Law-
rence compels a pivotal distinction between merely moral rea-
sons for regulating conduct and reasons that rely on a danger of 
concrete injury to third parties.313 Particular commercial 
speech regulations might fail due process review because they 
rested on insufficiently forceful showings of potential for injury, 
but courts could not presumptively dismiss the justifications 
usually offered for regulating commercial speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Present First Amendment doctrine does not protect expres-
sive freedom well enough. By treating political expression like 
any other kind of speech and balancing it against government 
regulatory interests, federal courts have allowed entrenched 
power and majoritarian pressure to stifle political debate and 
dissent. Conversely, by following the intuition that personal 
autonomy justifies expressive freedom but never explicating 
what personal autonomy means and what government interests 
can properly trump it, courts have created an often incoherent 
system of expressive freedom that underprotects artistic and 
cultural expression, overprotects corporate and commercial 
speech, and manages at turns to overprotect and underprotect 
pornography. Theorists who view expressive freedom as a posi-
tive public right rooted in the need for informed democratic dis-
course have long advocated a sensible solution to the political 
speech side of the problem: narrow the First Amendments pro-
tection to political speech but deepen the force of that protec-
tion to make suppression of political expression virtually im-
possible. 
The Supreme Courts substantive due process jurispru-
dence complements that solution by providing a way to protect 
nonpolitical speech outside the First Amendment. The Court 
has grounded substantive due process protection in a rich and 
thorough account of personal autonomy. The Court also has de-
clared that personal autonomy interests must yield to counter-
vailing governmental regulatory interests only where the gov-
ernment regulates to prevent some tangible harm, as distinct 
 
 312. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 37879 (rejecting a consumer protection ration-
ale on grounds of predicted ineffectiveness); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 770 (rejecting a public health justification on grounds of paternalism). 
 313. See supra notes 21318 and accompanying text (discussing the Law-
rence Courts embrace of the harm principle). 
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from a purely moral affront to the majoritys sensibilities. 
These two principles of substantive due process, which resonate 
deeply with the rhetoric of prevailing autonomy-based First 
Amendment doctrine, allow for a revision of constitutional ex-
pressive freedom that would reflect the distinct reasons why 
the Constitution protects political and nonpolitical speech. 
Nonpolitical expression, which contributes powerfully but not 
uniquely to the personal autonomy of both speakers and listen-
ers, should take its place in the pantheon of substantive due 
process rights, where the Courts prohibition against purely 
moral regulation provides strong assurance against govern-
ment censorship of unpopular ideas. 
This Articles proposal for amending free speech doctrine 
may raise concerns in two camps. First, some civil libertarians 
may view it as a Trojan horse, designed to impose on the First 
Amendment a substantive preference for political speech while 
maneuvering nonpolitical speech into a weakened position. In 
fact, my proposal refines the public rights theory of expressive 
freedom by taking personal autonomy seriously and developing 
a basis for powerful nonpolitical speech protection that im-
proves on the coherence of present First Amendment doctrine. 
Second, judicial minimalists may fear assigning courts the con-
ceptually difficult and important tasks of distinguishing politi-
cal from nonpolitical speech and, in nonpolitical speech cases, 
striking a proper balance between personal autonomy values 
and government interests in preventing harms. My proposal, 
however, asks judges to draw no more difficult lines and strike 
no more challenging balances than any doctrine of expressive 
freedom inevitably must and present First Amendment doc-
trine already does. The proposal improves on present doctrine 
by compelling judges in free speech cases to articulate and ap-
ply the specific values that anchor our constitutional commit-
ment to protecting both political and nonpolitical speech. 
